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ABSTRACT
Title

of

Dissertation:

AN

ANALYSIS

OF

THE

EFFICIENCY

AND

COMPETITIVENESS OF UMM QASR PORT IN IRAQ
The dissertation is a study of the importance of cost/time of a ship related to the
problems and constraints in port facilities and the quality of services that are hampering
Umm Qasr Port (‘UQP’) to be a competitive and efficient port. It develops and asks the
composite research question: “Can UQP improve its competitiveness by modifications
to its facilities, and if so, which modifications are necessary?” Under the Port User Cost
concept it analyses the turnaround time of vessels in the port as the most important
element concerning the users of the port. Therefore, subsequent analysis of outcomes
aims to solve the problems which influence and hinder the competitive level of UQP.
The reasons behind this topic are results of the competition of neighbouring ports in the
same region in attracting cargo owners and shipping lines to transport their cargo over
land to Iraq as a way to increase the Iraqi economy and projects relating to the
reconstruction of infra- and superstructures of the country after several wars.
Analytical techniques will be applied to port operations involving the port facilities, and
quality of services. It will also refer to the geographical location in connection with
hinterlands of neighbouring port countries, for example Kuwait, Syria, Turkey and
Jordan to measure UQP’s efficiency to identify the problems that need to be solved in
order to place UQP in line with increasing Iraqi cargo volume, and development in the
maritime sector in Iraq’s neighbouring countries.
Considering the damage of years of wars in Iraq followed by huge budgets for several
projects to rehabilitate the country, the need of Iraqi ports, in particular Umm Qasr Port,
is to be more effective and efficient in receiving vessels with attractive services, with
fewer delays and lower costs by improving UQP’s competitiveness and performance in
terms of service time.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
AKCNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................iii
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................... v
List of Tables .................................................................................................. ix
List of Figures .................................................................................................. x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................. xi
1.

2

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1
1.1

BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................... 1

1.2

CURRENT SITUATION OF IRAQ .............................................................................. 2

1.2.1

IRAQI ECONOMIC SITUATION .................................................................. 3

1.2.2

UMM QASR PORT ............................................................................................... 5

1.3

UQP UNDER-UTILIZATION AND TIME PROBLEMS ............................................ 8

1.4

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES .......................................................................................... 9

1.5

HOW TO RESEARCH ................................................................................................ 10

1.6

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................................. 11

1.7

SCOPE OF THE STUDY ............................................................................................ 11

LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................... 13
2.1

PORT COMPETITION AND COMPETITIVENESS ................................................ 13

2.2

USER’S PERSPECTIVES ........................................................................................... 15

2.3

TIME IN PORT (TURNAROUND TIME) ................................................................. 16

2.4

PORT SERVICE FACILITIES.................................................................................... 18

2.5

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION ................................................................................. 20

2.6

REGIONAL BORDER CROSSINGS ......................................................................... 21

2.6.1

MAJOR ROUTES TO IRAQ............................................................................... 21

2.6.1.1

THE SYRIA AND TURKISH CORRIDORS ..................................................... 21

2.6.1.2

ROUTE OF THE AQABA PORT IN JORDAN ................................................. 22

2.6.1.3

ROUTE OF THE PORTS IN IRAQ .................................................................... 22

2.7

MANAGERIAL DIFFICULTIES ............................................................................... 24

vi

2.8
3

OPERATIONAL DIFFICULTIES .............................................................................. 25

QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY ON UQP OPERATIONS ................................ 27
3.1

NAVIGATION CONTROL......................................................................................... 30

3.1.1

WAITING AREA ................................................................................................ 30

3.1.2

COMMUNICATIONS ......................................................................................... 32

3.1.3

PILOTAGE SERVICE......................................................................................... 32

3.1.4

LIGHT AND BUOY SERVICE .......................................................................... 33

3.1.5

CHANNEL DEPTH SERVICE ........................................................................... 34

3.1.6

BERTHING AND UNBERTHING SERVICE ................................................... 36

3.1.7

TUG BOAT SERVICE ........................................................................................ 37

3.2

4

BERTH CONTROL ..................................................................................................... 37

3.2.1

UQP FACILITIES ............................................................................................... 37

3.2.2

HINTERLAND FROM SOUTH PORT (UQPS) ................................................ 42

3.2.3

HINTERLAND OF UQP FROM NORTH PORT (UQPN) ................................ 42

ANALISIS OF TIME-RELATED KPIs ....................................................... 46
4.1

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 46

4.2

VESSELS’ CHARACTERISTICS .............................................................................. 46

4.3

ANALYSIS SHIP TIME IN CASE STUDY ............................................................... 48

4.3.1

M/V SIREEN-B ................................................................................................... 49

4.3.2

M/V CAPTAIN HARRY ..................................................................................... 51
AVERAGE TIME ‘AT’ IN THE PORT ...................................................................... 54

4.4
4.4.1

AVERAGE TIME IN THE BERTS 20-21 IN UQPN ......................................... 54

4.4.2

AVERAGE TIME IN UQP IN 2011 AT VESSEL SIZE GROUPS ................... 55

4.4.3

AVERAGE TIME IN DRY BULK AND BAGGING CARRIERS .................... 56

4.4.4

AVERAGE TIME IN BREAK-BULK: CONTAINER CARGO ........................ 57

4.4.5

AVERAGE TIME IN GENERAL CARGO & OTHER VSLS ........................... 58

4.4.6

AVERAGE SERVICE TIME IN UQP IN 2005 TO 2013 ................................... 60

4.4.7

UQPS AND UQPN ANNUAL IMPROVEMENT .............................................. 60

4.5

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATION ON KPIs OUTCOMES ....................................... 62

vii

4.5.1

AVERAGE TIME IN PORT (ATP) .................................................................... 62

4.5.2

AVERAGE WAITING TIME (AWT) ................................................................. 63

4.5.3

AVERAGE MANEUVERING TIME (AMT) ..................................................... 64

4.5.4

AVERAGE BERTHING OR SERVING TIME (ABT) ...................................... 65

4.5.5

AVERAGE PRODUCTIVE TIME (APT) AND AVERAGE IDLE TIME (AIT)
65

4.5.6

AVERAGE GRADE WAITING TIME (AGW) ................................................. 66

4.6
5

SIGNIFICANT WAYS TO IMPROVE THE TIME IN UQP ..................................... 66

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. 68
5.1

CONCLUSTION ......................................................................................................... 68

5.2

RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................. 69

5.2.1

NAVIGATIONAL CONTROL ........................................................................... 69

5.2.1.1

WAITING TIME ................................................................................................. 69

5.2.1.2

MANEUVERING TIME ..................................................................................... 70

5.2.2

BERTH CONTROL ............................................................................................. 72

5.2.3

LAND CONTROL ............................................................................................... 74

5.3

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY ............................................................................... 75

REFERENCES ................................................................................................ 77
APPENDIX (1) QUESTIONNAIRE .................................................................. 80
APPENDIX (2) QUESTIONNAIRE -RESPONDENT RESULTS .......................... 82
APPENDIX (3) MONTHLY MUD DREDGING CARRY IN 2010 ....................... 88
APPENDIX (4) VESSELS CALLING UQP IN 2010 TO 2012 ............................ 89
APPENDIX (5) WILHELMSEN-STATEMENT OF FACTS-M/V SIREEN-B ....... 90
APPENDIX (5-B) TURNAROUND TIME CALCULATIONS OF M/V SIREEN -B 92
APPENDIX (6) INCHCAPE-STATEMENT OF FACTS- M/V CAPTAIN HARRY 93
APPENDIX (6-B) TURNAROUND TIME CALCULATIONS OF M/V CAPTAIN
HARRY .......................................................................................................... 96

viii

List of Tables

Table 1 Key Economic Figures of Iraq .............................................................................. 4
Table 2 Total Cargo Volume in UQP ................................................................................ 8
Table 3 Typical Ship Costs .............................................................................................. 16
Table 4 Distances from neighbouring Ports to Iraq ......................................................... 22
Table 5 GCPI staff numbers from 2005 to 2013 ............................................................. 25
Table 6 UQPS Facilities .................................................................................................. 39
Table 7 UQPN Facilities .................................................................................................. 40
Table 8 Import Documentation Duration and Cargo Delivery ........................................ 44
Table 9 Calculations of Time in Port of M/V SIREEN-B ............................................... 49
Table 10 Calculations of Time in Port of M/V CAPTAIN HARRY............................... 52
Table 11 Time in UQP: Berths 20-21, Container Terminal ............................................ 54
Table 12 Time in UQP: Dry bulk and bagging Carriers in 2011 .................................... 56
Table 13 Time in UQP: Break-bulk: Container Vessels in 2011 .................................... 58
Table 14 Time in UQP: Break-bulk, General Cargo and other Vessels in 2011 ............. 59

ix

List of Figures

Figure 1 UQP and other Iraqi ports Location .................................................................... 6
Figure 2 Neighbouring Ports connected to Iraq ................................................................. 7
Figure 3 Dissertation Structure ........................................................................................ 10
Figure 4 Time in Port ....................................................................................................... 18
Figure 5 Imported Cargo Transport Routes to Iraq ......................................................... 23
Figure 6 Navigational Channel Assessments................................................................... 28
Figure 7 Availability of Facilities .................................................................................... 29
Figure 8 Stevedores Performance and Conduct ............................................................... 29
Figure 9 UQP Anchorage Area ........................................................................................ 32
Figure 10 Monthly Mud loads carried by dredgers in 2010 ............................................ 35
Figure 11 UQP Layout ..................................................................................................... 38
Figure 12 Availability of Equipment and Cargo Gears ................................................... 41
Figure 13 UQP Storage Area Assessment ....................................................................... 43
Figure 14 Observation of First in First served in providing service ................................ 44
Figure 15 UQP handling per tons in 2010 to 2012 .......................................................... 47
Figure 16 Number of vessels calling UQP in 2010 to 2012 ............................................ 48
Figure 17 Main elements of TRT of M/V Sireen-b ......................................................... 50
Figure 18 Main elements of TRT of M/V Captain Harry ................................................ 53
Figure 19 Main elements of TRT in UQP in Berths 20-21 ............................................. 55
Figure 20 Mail elements of TRT of dry and bagging Carriers in UQP in 2011 .............. 57
Figure 21 Main elements of TRT of Container vessels in UQP in 2011 ......................... 58
Figure 22 Main elements of TRT of G Cargo & other vessels in UQP in 2011.............. 59
Figure 23 UQP Service Time in 2005 to 2013 ................................................................ 60
Figure 24 UQPN & UQPS cargoes in GT in 2012 .......................................................... 61
Figure 25 Number of Vessels Calling UQPN & UQPS in 2012 .................................... 61

x

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

ABT………………………………. Average Berthing (Service) Time
AGW……………………………….Average Grade of Waiting
AIT………………………………...Average Idle Time
AMT…………………………….…Average Maneuvering Time
APT………………………………...Average Productive Time
ATP………………………………....Average Time in Port
AWR……………………………….Average Waiting Ratio
AWT……………………………….Average Waiting Time
BOR………………………………. Berth Occupancy Ratio
CIDA……………………………….Canadian International Development Agency
CUR………………………………..Crane Utilization Ratio
EOSP……………………………….Estimates Of Sea Passage
GT…………………………………Gross Tonnage
ICT…………………………………Iraq Container Terminal
IRC…………………………………Iraqi Railways Corporation
JICA ……………………………….Japan International Cooperation Agency
KZP…………………………………Khor Az Zubayr Port
LPI ………………………………....Logistics Performance Index
LUR………………………………...Labour Utilization Ratio
PUC ………………………………..Port User Cost
TEU……………………………..… Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit
TRT………………………………...Turnaround Time
UNCTAD………………………… The United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development
UQP ………......................................Umm Qasr Port
UQPN ……………………………...North Umm Qasr Port
UQPS ………………………………South Umm Qasr Port
Vsls…………………………………Vessels
VTS………………………………...Vessel Traffic Service

xi

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
Iraq is gradually expanding its trade with the international community, via exports and
imports. The state’s economy has to recover damages caused by many years of war. In
the last decade, the main sources of Iraq’s imports have been Turkey, Jordan, Vietnam,
the United States, Germany, and Britain. In the meantime, the GDP has increased
slightly in recent years.
The United Nations’ Joint Analysis Policy Unit (UN-JAPU, 2013) has issued a
background paper on Iraq’s budget for 2013. The Government expenditure for 2013
totals IQD 138.4 Trillion ($ 118.3 Billion), with an increase of 18% over 2012 and
exceeding 70% of GDP1. On the other hand, Iraq is developing its oil industry together
with global oil companies to increase oil export capacity which will require more
equipment to be imported from other countries.
It is a well-known fact that about 90% of the global trade is by sea transport, which is
considered to be a mechanism for world trade. The global network of merchant ships
provides one of the most important modes of transportation. Global trade movements
connect with ports of call as a link with other transportation networks.
Therefore, there is an urgent need to develop the transport sector in general and ports in
particular to assist in facilitating such huge development plans to meet with the
mentioned projects and extraordinary budget allocation. UQP, the major port in Iraq, has
the potential to endeavor faster to handle increasing cargo and to be a competitive port in
the region. The research will discuss the factors that affect such fast growth and try to
recommend solutions to the port authority to take serious actions to meet future
requirements.
1
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Competition from neighboring ports is substantial although UQP is able to compete and
attract new traffic with its existing facilities and services if its performance and
competitiveness level increases. However, the neighboring ports continue to pose a
challenge for the UQP maritime sector.
On the other hand the UQP faced under-utilization as a result of the long turnaround
time of vessels staying at the port while competing neighbouring ports in Kuwait, Syria,
Turkey and Jordan have been more attractive to the shipping lines and shippers causing
Iraq-bound commodities to be imported by land transportation even though these
alternative ways of transport are more costly.
These factors will be determined by quality of services in terms of the time in a port of a
vessel, appropriate port facilities to be in line with development projects established by
JICA , Japan International Cooperation Agency and other Iraqi and donor projects which
will be highlighted in this research, and finally the geographical location in connection
with hinterlands of neighbouring ports, which may give rise to shipping lines and cargo
owners avoiding the long-time cost in a port of a vessel if not addressed these factors
will lead to transport of cargo overland rather than through UQP. And another important
factor as mentioned above is Iraqi ports are restricted by their reduced capacity due to
several wars that affected their appropriate infrastructure, superstructure and technical
facilities. Taken together, the UQP has become expensive port related to the time cost as
it has a gap in port efficiency.
1.2 CURRENT SITUATION OF IRAQ
The Iraqi economy has been affected by wars and political instability in various conflicts
over the past decades, which destroyed its economic structures. However, the situation
has continuously improved in recent years, providing a foundation for studying
increasing port competitiveness in this research. The need for such research could be
realized as a first impression when looking at Iraqi economic background and projects of
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extraordinary budget allocation, which increase estimations of cargo volumes and time
spent by ships at UQP. Therefore, the need speed up cargo handling and solve other
essential issues related to the time of the vessels at the port is urgent.
1.2.1 IRAQI ECONOMIC SITUATION
The Iraqi-Iranian War 1980-1988, Gulf war 1990 and economic embargo actions taken
by the United Nations followed by foreign occupation and terrorist activities after a
dictatorial regime of more than 30 years were various tragic events in Iraqi impacting on
its economic situation. However, the Iraqi economy rose again as it is dominated by the
oil and gas sector, and crude oil for its revenues as well as The World Bank’s portfolio
which are together aiding to spur Iraqi economic activities.
The need to rebuild the Iraqi economy and recall the damage that happened due to the
above mentioned events is urgent. Rebuilding its infrastructure and institutions through
several projects implemented by Iraqi governmental authorities with implementation
support from the World Bank consists of 22 projects valued at US$854 million,
accompanied by an increase in foreign investment to increase economic activity in Iraq.
It is well known that the increase of goods is growing along with GDP per capita as the
people consume goods accordingly which is resulting in an increase in imported cargo in
particularly container cargo. The GDP has increased by 9.78% to US$ 233.292 Billion,
making Iraq No. 46 in world rankings according to GDP (Current Prices, US Dollars) in
2013 (IMF, 2013), with 9.7% agricultural production, 29.8% services and 60.5%
industrial production. In addition, taking into account the increase in population to over
32.6 million people, the economic growth is still on a comparable level in terms of GDP
per capita as shown in Table 1:
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Table 1 Key Economic Figures of Iraq
Indicator Name
GNI per capita, PPP (current international $)
Population, total (Million)
GDP (current US$Billion)
GDP growth (annual %)
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
3010
3250
3430
3670
3920
28.7
29.5
30.2
31
32
88.8
131.6
111.7
135.5
180.6
1.38
6.61
5.81
5.86
8.58
67.86407317 67.87112195 68.0915122 68.48604878 68.9845122

2012
4300
32.6
210.3
8.43

Source: (World Bank, 2013)
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx

Moreover, according to Iraq-business news reports on 15 August 2013 (Iraqbusinessnews, 2013), the Electricity funds, with the Ministry’s budget for this year are
being increased to $14 billion to solve the major problem of distribution of electricity in
Iraq related to blackouts as a part of the reconstruction of Iraq among other huge
reforms.
In fact since mid-2009, oil export earnings have returned to levels seen before Operation
“Iraqi Freedom”. Iraq recently has made contracts with major oil companies, and has the
potential to greatly expand its oil revenues, which requires the country to upgrade its oil
processing, pipeline and import and export infrastructures to achieve this potential
(Financial Report, 2013).
Based on earnings from the oil industry, the country is currently initiating numerous
reconstruction and modernization projects throughout Iraq. Along with these
investments, the per capita income, and consequently, the demand for consumption are
expected to increase as well.
“Iraq has the fifth largest proven crude oil reserves in the world, and it passed Iran
as the second largest producer of crude oil in OPEC at the end of 2012, Iraq was the
sixth largest net exporter of petroleum liquids in the world in 2012, with the
majority of its oil exports going to the United States and to refineries in Asia. After
years of power shortages, Iraqi efforts to increase generating capacity are moving
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forward. Iraq plans to triple generating capacity to 27 gigawatts by the end of 2015”
(EIA, 2013) .
However, the security situation has negative impacts on clients that are dealing with
huge Iraqi projects.
In recent years, the security situation has improved, thus laying the foundation for the
advancement of oil exports and a first step to foreign investments. However, Iraq’s
transportation infrastructure is not enough for the scale of current port operations.
The situation above, Port Users will obtain a confidence in Iraq’s economic development
spurring them to transport their cargoes either by port facilities effectively in UQP, or,
choosing the neighboring ports for cost-effective transportation of the cargo.
In conclusion, it is inferred from the above that Iraq’s economy has increased
dramatically to give rise to increase in cargo volume, requiring that the Iraqi ports, in
particular UQP, should be developed to render good service and maintain and attract its
clients.
1.2.2 UMM QASR PORT
The Umm Qasr Port ‘UQP’ is the most important port in Iraq among the five
commercial ports namely, Khor Az Zubayr ‘KZP’, Abu Floss, Al Faw and Al Maqil
ports.
The UQP was built in 1962 and five years later was operated by GCPI. It has adequate
storage space as the north and south port of Umm Qasr consist of 160,000m² and of
800,000m² of open storage area. In Figure 1, the terminal area of berths of UQPN is
illustrated from an overhead perspective, also shown are the five commercial Iraqi ports.
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Figure 1 UQP and other Iraqi ports Location

Source: (JICA, 2012)
Interim Report, Data Collection Survey on Port Development Plan in Iraq

The 50,000 DWT class vessels can access the channel to the port, taking into account the
time of high water tide as the average depth for the 50 nautical mile channel from buoy #
1 to Umm Qasr is 12.5m. UQP is divided into a north port ‘UQPN’ and south port
‘UQPS’, which is considered the commercial deep-water port of the country. Both of
them consist of 24 berths, including 20 berths and 2 Ro/Ro-berths as well as 2 berths
recently are added, under names 11 a and 11 b at area nearby berth 11, for general
merchandise, containers, and other various cargos with channel depth of 12.5 m,
resulting in a global and maintainable supply chain active connection for importing and
exporting goods.
The access channel for UQP is Khor Abdullah which extends from the entrance located
at the north-west edge of the Arabian Gulf (Buoy No. 1 is placed) and was originally
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designed to be min. 200 m wide, with a 12.5 m draft below A.C.D, astronomical chart
datum, within approximately 50 Miles long.
Competition from neighboring ports is substantial although UQP is able to compete and
attract new traffic with its existing facilities and services if its performance and
competitiveness level increase. However, the neighboring ports continue to pose a
challenge for the UQP maritime sector. They are positioning themselves to develop an
entire maritime cluster of industries and services. Iraq’s geographical location features
natural hinterlands linking Kuwait, Syria, Jordan, and Turkey as well as Iran with
connections to their ports as shown in Figure (2):
Figure 2 Neighbouring Ports connected to Iraq

Source: Author, Google, 2013 (Google, 2013) https://maps.google.se/

Study is, therefore, necessary for Iraq performance ports to measure their efficiency.
That is required to ensure that the facilities operate well and that the time in port of a
vessel is minimized. Otherwise, the hinterland will be a good alternative for the users to
transport their cargoes instead of Iraqi ports.
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1.3 UQP UNDER-UTILIZATION AND TIME PROBLEMS
In the 1980’s in the Iraq-Iran war, Port activities diminished significantly, which made
the UQP receives a small quantity of cargo. Therefore, the port has faced a problem, an
underutilization which made the port less efficient and allowed its facilities to become
older and useless. It has taken many years to clear explosives and wreckage from the
part and sedimentation from the bottom of the channel to allow ships to use it safely.
Many factors of operations and management difficulties, therefore, have come together
due to the problem of under-utilization, resulting in a prolonged turnaround time for
vessels, which made the UQP an expensive port related to the cost of time.
Table (2) is shown how cargo volume and number of vessels at the UQP fluctuated from
1977 to 2010 which means the port has experienced difficulties during the period of the
wars and events of economic embargo.
Table 2 Total Cargo Volume in UQP

Year
1977
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Umm Qasr Port
Cargo
Ship
Volume
Calls
(x 1,000 tons)
222
3,173
3,913
3,843
6,022
7,001
6,083
1,682
2,105
3,244
7,659
6,310
7,595
7,662
7,513
8,622
9,335

Total
Annual
Growth

295
287
397
533
512
512
894
503
858
876
898
1,146
1,106
992
922

23
-2
57
16
-13
-72
25
54
136
-18
20
1
-2
15
8

Port
Capacity

Utiliasation
%
5,250
60.44

8,950
8,950
8,950
8,950
8,950
8,950
8,950
8,950
18,200
18,200
18,200
18,200
18,200
18,200
18,200

Source: GCPI Statistics & (JICA, 2012)
UQP statistic and Interim Report, Data Collection Survey on Port Development Plan in Iraq
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Port

43.72
42.94
67.28
78.22
67.97
18.79
23.52
36.25
42.08
34.67
41.73
42.10
41.28
47.37
51.29

The port started with a good standard utilisation of 60% according to UNCTAD as a
general cargo port. However, after the Iraq-Iran war from 1980 to 1988 and the Gulf
War in 1990 followed by embargo until 1999, the port started to decline sharply into
under utilisation until 1999, the period of exchange of food and oil by the UN. After that
the port has declined again in cargo volume since 2003 with a handling volume of
1,681,000 tons. The total cargo volumes increased after making the lowest volume in
2003. Although, there was a slight growth in the annual capacity in 2012 compared with
past years, it may not continue as there is, nowadays, an opportunity due to Syria’s ports
being closed temporarily due to the current crisis, which will affect this growth when the
political events improve.
The problem of vessels staying a long time at the UQP is one of the symptoms of the
underutilization problem. According to the annual statistics of the UQP in 2011,
container vessels were spent about 4 days and break-bulk of general cargo and other
vessels about 13 days on average in UQP. Furthermore, the case is worse with dry bulk
carriers like grain vessels which spent about 21 days as there are long procedures as
shown in section 4.4.3.Therefore, a study of turnaround a time of the vessel at UQP is
necessary in order to identify problems and propose solutions toward effective and
efficient port operations.
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
To achieve the research goal the author needs to identify and determine the port
operations related to the time in port of a vessel. Constraints and problems at the port
will be highlighted to know which aspects need to be taken care of in order to be able to
improve the port’s competitiveness and efficiency. Under the Port User Cost concept it
will analyse turnaround time of the vessel in the port as the most important element
concerning the user of the port. Therefore, the analysis will be applied to solve the
problems that influence and hinder the competitive level and performance of UQP,
eventually making it more attractive to users.
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1.5 HOW TO RESEARCH
Figure 3 shows the structure of this dissertation and the methodologies used according to
Professor Moon lecture handouts (2013).
Figure 3 Dissertation Structure

Umm Qasr Port ‘UQP’ Competitiveness
Underutilization and time cost problems
Literature of review

Port Facilities

Service Quality

Geographic Location

Methodology that used to measure the Efficiency of port

KPIs

Questionnaires

Outputs

Outputs

Analysis of Results

Implications of UQP
Competitiveness

Conclusion & Recommendations
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1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In this research the author plans to use the following methodology, a literature review, a
questionnaire as well as KPI analysis in order to identify the problems and constraints that
prolong the time of vessels to improve the competitiveness and efficiency of the UQP.
A literature review is used to study significant previous research, reports and conferences
which have been pursued on the subject by different authors to contribute to ideas and
suggestions to develop the topic. A questionnaire was carried out by making inquiries of the
ports clients in order to support research findings through contacting most shipping lines and
consignees.
1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The study is presented in five main chapters as follows:
Chapter 1 – Introduction: This chapter gives an overview of the whole research. It
describes the background, structure of the study, and identifies the main research
objectives and methodology.
Chapter 2 – Literature review: In this chapter, the author will survey previous studies in
two main groups. One concerns port competition and other issues related to port
efficiency.
Chapter 3 – Methodology of Measuring Efficiency of UQP will be presented in chapter
3 through questionnaire survey. It deals with several questions: which are given to users
of UQP.
Chapter 4– This chapter analyses UQP through applying the KPI analysis to support the
outcomes in the questionnaire methodology by assessing the situation of port operation
and the time in port of vessels for attracting vessels and shipping lines to the port
through the requirement of competitive advantage and minimizing time at the port.
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Chapter 5 –This chapter arranges for a conclusion concerning the level of
competitiveness in existing port services in UQP according to this research in terms of
cost effectiveness, and time saving. Some recommendations will be given for developing
UQP in order to make the port competitive to increase its productivity and throughput.
The discussion and analysis in this research will be based on the author’s previous
experience as an employee at the UQP, contacts with port users and clients, data
available about rival ports, relevant reference books, articles, magazines, field trips and
lectures on port performance, management and logistics from World Maritime
University.
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2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 PORT COMPETITION AND COMPETITIVENESS
Prof. Willy Winkelmans, (2003) stated that “The final aim of port competition is indeed
not just getting more traffic, more tonnage, etc., but achieving a sustainable degree of
generating added values in relation to the input and effort.”
In this regard, it is necessary to understand basically the main idea that drives port
competition and the factors that make the port more effective in terms of competition. A
further question is can the port be managed in a good way with less time to achieve
profits and avoid losing clients. Strong management is essential to overcome the
problems or weaknesses in a port as results of the nature of the maritime sector as a
competitive environment which becomes more challenging as global trade becomes
more intensive, according to increase in freight volumes, and container traffic.
Development of port facilities and the quality of services is needed to attract clients and
transform threats into opportunities.
According to (UNCTAD, 1995, p. 4), “In an Asian port in 1992, 458 containers were
handled in 3 ¼ hours and the vessel stayed at berth for less than half a day, while in
another port in the region, the same number of containers required a vessel to spend 2 to
3 days in the port.”
Alderton (2005, p. 17) in his book Port Management and Operations stated that “Ports,
like most other commercial activities, are constantly changing. Their design and
infrastructure change as the vehicles using them change and their functions develop and
alter as the trade passing through them varies in type and quantity.”
Therefore, the Iraqi government started to develop the port facilities through the
National Development Strategy (NDS) in October 2004 at the Tokyo Conference and
the reconstruction strategy for the Transportation Sector was given highest priority
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among other urgent infrastructure development projects in Iraq. In particular, the
restoration projects of the UQP and KZP followed by the Iraq Port Sector Rehabilitation
Project Phase 1 for the UQP by Japan, Official Development Assistant (ODA), in 20092012 the JICA projects and other contributions in particular DANIDA from the Danish
government, which donated 2 million dollars, are all cooperating developing UQP
facilities.
Furthermore, it is important to mention that before 2003 Iraqi ports were underutilized
without any solution to solve this problem. It is obvious that Iraq has lived through
several wars as well as having a dictatorial regime that did not care or listen to the
technical people and qualified staff or pay attention to developments in other countries.
As an example, Iraq did not send students to WMU or any International education
institution until 2003. Even then, the students have been sponsored exclusively by
donors. This situation has resulted in a lack of competitive culture in addition to the
negative impact of these wars.
Focusing on the period after 2003 as the beginning of the return of Iraqi ports to the
international maritime community is the first step to develop the Iraqi ports, in particular
UQP. The Iraqi government developed a good strategy plans for the development of the
ports, giving urgency to UQP in association with the JICA project and other
contributions by the International Bank and Iraqi friend countries like Denmark to
develop and improve UQP’s performance.
However, in spite of these projects to develop the UQP and other Iraqi ports by
government and several associations, the problem is still there similar to the case of
ports in the Eastern Caribbean States that developed by the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) as mentioned in section 2.4.
As a result, the UQP should be studied and necessary changes identified in order to stay
in line with its competitors as a first step. UQP could be a more effective and efficient
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port when it is changed with development of its facilities to satisfy the customers and cut
the cost of time.
2.2 USER’S PERSPECTIVES
The concept of PUC, ‘port user cost’ is the most important issue concerning the users of
the port, and is considered the main reason that determines the port as attractive or not.
It can be illustrated through a basic example when a vessel is berthing at a port; there are
huge costs according to the time at the port as detailed in Table (3). For instance, the
cost of the time is calculated according to the price of the vessel divided by the useful
life of the vessel times the number of days in the year and number of hours in the day to
result in the sum of money the owner will lose. Furthermore, to calculate for charterer
vessel, what the cost of a day in port will be, divide the freight rate per day by the
number of hours in a day to get the sum of the money that the charterer will spend in one
day as well as the demurrage that charterer has to pay to the owner in case the ship is
delayed on the agreed and acceptable laytime days.
Berth occupancy which is defined as the total time of vessels at berth divided by total
berth hours available is considering as an indicator of port performance. High berth
occupancy is not preferable to users of the port as it costs more than they expect as well
as it means there is congestion in the port. On the other hand, low occupancy in the berth
means the port has an underutilization problem. Therefore, connecting with
recommended utilisation by UNCTAD to be 65 to 70% care should be taken to render
efficient service for all facilities in the port with regard to the berth occupancy in relation
with cost per day at the port. See Table (3) that cited by Mkango (Mkango, 1997).
However, the berth occupancy depends on the main characteristics of the berths and
vessels coming to the port in terms of type and size.
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Table 3 Typical Ship Costs

Vessel Classification

Optional Berth

Cost per day at port

Occupancy
General Cargo Vessels

65-75%

US$ 8.000

Bulk Carriers

35%

US$ 15.000

Container Vessel

50-55%

US$ 30.000

Oil Tankers

30%

US$ 45.000

Source: IPP III (1997)-WMU

According to the Table above UQP has a high cost for the users as there is a long
berthing time there, about 6.5 to 12.5 days on average, from 2005 to 2013, (see
section 4.4.6 ). Furthermore, taking into account the type of vessels received by the port
of UQP that is general cargo vessels and bulk carriers as well as container vessels within
6 berths, to be highly sensitive with cost considerations requires great care to provide
good facilities as a first stage by port management to solve this problem related to the
time in port of a vessel to increase the efficiency to be a competitive port. The shorter
time of the vessel in a port, the lower the cost will be and the more efficient the port will
be from the user point of view.
2.3 TIME IN PORT (TURNAROUND TIME)
Drake Education Association, (UNCTAD, 1982, p. 18) stated that ship turnround Time
is the total time spent by a particular vessel in port. Also it is defined in another sense as
the average time spent in port by all vessels calling in a specific period. Then they are
divided into two components namely, the Waiting Time and Ship’s Time at Berth.
The time in the port is not only an essential factor to clients but also to the port as the
most important element to reduce or increase port competitiveness, which should be
observed all the time in port operations. Several Authors as well as the UNCTAD have

16

given a strong interest to this issue as they believed that the time at port is the most
important factor to develop the port and to achieve profits to all parties concerned in
business in the port sector.
Drake Educational Associates (UNCTAD, 1982, pp. 18, Unite2) stated that:
Ship Turnaround Time gives an excellent indication of the speed of service being
provided to ship operators; it is a very important element in determining maritime
costs. Moreover, the berth utilization is really measures of how the intensively berth
facilities and resources are used in order to think that a high Berth Occupancy value
is desirable and that indicates high berth efficiency which advised within the range
60% to 70% as a safe berth occupancy value.
Therefore, the time in port of a vessel is one of the main indicators used to measure the
quality of services in the port. It is calculated by the time a vessel arrives at the port to
the time it leaves that port at last buoy of the channel at pilot station. It involves a
waiting time; a maneuvering time; Berthing time or service time including the
Productivity time. According to lecture Handouts by Professor Moon (2013) the above
activities can be seen clearly in Figure 4:
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Figure 4 Time in Port

Source: Professor Daniel Moon, Handout 2013
(Moon, Port Performance Indicators (PPI). Unpublished Lecture Handouts , 2013)

Thus, analyzing the time of the vessel at the port to measure port performance is
essential to present a good service in the port to be able to compete with other ports and
increase efficiency and competitiveness.
2.4 PORT SERVICE FACILITIES
“High costs, poor services and low efficiency and productivity are symptoms of the
problem rather than the causes. When there are problems in the port, the infrastructure
and the cargo-handling equipment are often first considered to be at fault.” (UNCTAD,
1995, p. 5)
UNCTAD held a seminar on port operations in Basrah (Iraq) from 5 to15 November
1979, Systematic Methods for Increasing Throughput and Reducing Ship Turn Round
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time, to optimize transport and cargo handling operations in ports and their hinterland.
They found that once the bottlenecks to higher berth throughput have been located, there
are basically two ways in which the berth throughput capacity can be increased, either
by improving the operations methods or by investment in new facilities which lead to a
direct financial gain to the port and its users. They came up with methods of optimizing
transport and cargo handling operations in ports and their hinterland, to minimize cost in
real terms, to contribute to the growth of the national economy.
However, Ports beyond the phenomenon of facilities and service, in terms of the
importance, port competition exceeds the pure fact of having good facilities. Port
competition means that the success of a port no longer depends totally on its own
facilities. For example, in the 1970’s, in spite of

the Canadian International

Development Agency is contribution to port development (CIDA) in most of the Eastern
Caribbean States by financing infrastructure, superstructure and equipment, the ports in
this region still experienced difficulties and the problems were not solved. Then,
Novaport Limited, a port consultancy firm was engaged by CIDA to manage the project
and provide the technical assistance and training services. They found that the assistance
provided by CIDA to four Caribbean ports confirmed that significant improvement to
the ports’ productivity and financial situation could be achieved at relatively low cost.
As a result of these improvements , the ports which appeared to operate at maximum
capacity at the start of projects, have been able to handle 50% increase in traffic 9 years
later without building any new infrastructure and have not yet reached their saturation
point. And they said, the better utilization of the existing facilities can be attributed to
the introduction of modern cargo handling systems, training staff and the introduction of
a limited amount of equipment to facilitate the handling of containers, which had been
contemplated when the ports were designed and built. However, they found the project
did not succeed in removing all the government interference in day by day management
of the ports. (CIDA, 1992, pp. 2.1 , 2.8 and 2.9).
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Furthermore, in 1989 the UNCTAD survey in ports of four African countries namely,
Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya and Senegal as the investment in modern port found that
the real causes of the problems of under-utilisation were institutional rather than
established the modern facilities as the interface between the government and the port
was too heavy and therefore these ports were very cost to clients. (UNCTAD, 1995, p.
5)
Therefore, the most important issue that has to be understood by the GCPI is to
determine the challenges that UQP has to deal with to improve its performance and
achieve effective and efficient work to satisfy its clients. One of the challenges, that all
parts of the port operation face are related to the time cost of users.
2.5 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION
From cargo owners’ point of view, Port Location is the most important factor in terms of
the total costs. The port that would add some miles to their routes will be excluded.
Therefore, comparing to UQP’s location, the shipping line calculate the distance of
neighbouring ports to the trade routes to find which one is more efficient to their
business. Therefore, the port location should be taken into account when the port
management assesses the competitiveness of a port.
In spite of economic and social benefits of the flow of goods across the border, it

represents a threat to the productivity of the port when the shipping lines use the
hinterland connecting Iraq's border with its neighbouring ports.
However, one of the technical reasons as a major factor affecting the demand of
maritime transport according to (Ma, 2012, p. 34) is the Land Bridge that can be a
terrible threat to maritime transport, especially those across the Euro-Asia continent.
Once the political and technical difficulties are overcome in some of countries of
transit, the land bridge (a railway link between coasts) alternative will become
serious competition to the maritime transport option. This is because the total transit
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time can be reduced by more than 30% while the cost can be kept at almost the same
level or even cheaper compared with the sea alternative. The same situation, to a
different extent of course, may happen in other continents such as South America or
Africa once the land transport system has been improved.
As a result, it is imperative that the UQP be concerned about long turnaround time of
vessels at the port by taking practical steps to minimize the time with high priority on
the port facilities to achieve good services, as there are challenges by other ports that
could attract users of the port through border crossings.
2.6 REGIONAL BORDER CROSSINGS
The UQP has faced sensitive competition from neighbouring ports through the border
crossings that have a negative impact on its productivity and throughput. However, the
port has a competitive advantage on its rivals as the UQP is close to the market
compared with transportation distances from these ports to the Iraqi market. The
shipping lines and cargo owners are concerned about total cost which should be taken in
account in UQP management.
2.6.1

MAJOR ROUTES TO IRAQ

Iraq with its neighbouring countries is connected through the infrastructure of
surrounding land that allows cargo and people have exchanged easily among them.
There are several corridors between these countries as follow:
2.6.1.1

THE SYRIA AND TURKISH CORRIDORS

From the Mersin port in Turkey and the Tartous and Latakia ports in Syria, cargo is
transported through this route to the north of Iraq. From the Turkish ports of Mersin at
the Mediterranean Sea, with short transit times to/from Europe, cargo is transported
overland via the Turkish-Iraqi border point Zakho to northern cities and also to central
Iraqi destinations. Mersin port is located approximately 1, 400 km away from Baghdad.
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2.6.1.2

ROUTE OF THE AQABA PORT IN JORDAN

From the Aqaba port in Jordan to the north of Baghdad, it is approximately 1,500km,
through the Jordan-Iraq border point Trebil. From all European main ports to Aqaba
port and vice versa, there are regular shipments that make this route one of the most
important in International Maritime Trade. Moreover, this route is used to transport
cargo overland from ports in Syria and Turkey.
2.6.1.3

ROUTE OF THE PORTS IN IRAQ

Form the ports in Basrah, in the south of Iraq, namely Umm Qasr, Khor Az Zubayr, Abu
Flus and Al Maqil Ports, the cargo is imported to Iraq, and in particular to eight city
regions. However, some of these cities depend on the Aqaba port in Jordan and the ports
in Kuwait and Iran to import their cargo. Kuwaiti ports are approximately 700km away
from Baghdad and only approximately 200km away from Basrah and, roughly, the case
is the same with Iranian ports in Khorramshahr and Bandar-e Emam Khomeyni ports as
closer neighbouring ports to South and Central Iraq. Table (4) shows the distances from
the neighbouring ports to Basrah and Baghdad, the main cities in Iraq.
Table 4 Distances from neighbouring Ports to Iraq

Port

Basrah

Baghdad

Iraqi-neighbouring border

Border point

UQP

70km

600km

-

-

Shuwaikh-Kuwait

200km

700km

120km

Safwoan

Aqaba-Jordan

2000km

1,500km

870Km

Trebil

Mersin-Turkey

1900km

1, 400 km

950

Zakho

Source: Author

Based on Japan International Cooperation Agency Study 2002 (JICA, 2012), Figure 5
shows the imported cargo through these corridors and routes.
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Figure 5 Imported Cargo Transport Routes to Iraq

Source: The study for Development of Southern Port in Iraqi Cited by (JICA, 2012)
Interim Report, Data Collection Survey on Port Development Plan in Iraq

An interview survey done (JICA, 2012) in 2009 through a Consultant Committee in
charge of the Port Rehabilitation Project Phase 1 stated that with truck transport
companies who are handling cargoes transported by trucks to Iraq from ports of
neighboring countries an approximately 60% of the total imported cargoes has been
transported from Route 2 (the Aqaba port in Jordan) to Iraq, 30 % was from ports of the
northern and western corridors in Turkey and Syria, and an only around 10 % of the total
imported cargoes was through the UQP and KZP ports in the southern region of Iraq.
Minimizing the time of the vessel in UQP, to avoid above situation, by presenting a
good service and improving the facilities in the port is the major aim of the Iraqi
government and the GCPI.
Furthermore, the problems of inadequate facilities, limitations of channel in its draft to
receive bigger vessels to serve the shipping lines, as they are concerned about economies
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of scale, involve many difficulties causing the port to be less effective with high costs to
the users.
2.7 MANAGERIAL DIFFICULTIES
Excessive interference by the government in internal and external affairs is causing
many problems to the port. The activities that need to be done immediately for the work
to succeed do not work with the government bureaucratic system, which makes for long
procedures in Iraqi ports. For example, when equipment should be replaced as the work
changes are required; it takes a long time to obtain approval to start. From the middle
manager, Board Director then ministry agreement which will give an advantage to the
competitors of the port.
A lack of decision making in the port is a problem affecting competitive advantage as a
result of deficiency of management information system and other relevant technologies.
There is no way managers can give incentives to encourage the users when they increase
their calls due to lack of IT services in the port.
In addition, there is no analytical information with regards to operational activities to
evaluate the situation of port, such as the bottlenecks, and use results to enhance the port
performance. Another threat to port managers for taking decisions is the conflict of
authorities within port premises and operations. For instance, the navigation manager
and dredging manager who are serving port activities follow another authority, which is
not located at the port.
The lack of sustainable strategy planning for marketing evolution, the use of information
and for training programs at all levels of the port staff is problematic and precludes
phased advancement of sustainable development of good management. This policy
should be associated with the mission’s overall strategy to progressively transfer
functional port responsibilities to selected qualified staff.
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“Strategic planning is the managerial process of developing and maintaining a strategic
direction that aligns the organizations’ goals and resources with its changing market
opportunities… In order a company to remain strong in a competitive environment its
should carry out strategic planning” (Visvikis, 2013)
Furthermore, the GCPI as a part of the Iraqi Government institutions, in the days of
election, would get additional stuff as a campaign for the party that is responsible for
this ministry, in our case, the transport ministry. The new staff has no qualifications, no
job to do, and they are untrained, causing overstaffing problems as well as creating a
morale considerations for those who work hard with little difference in wages compared
with this new staff. Unfortunately, the situation has been repeating every election
campaign. The situation is clear when looking at Table (5) within three election times,
2004, 2008 and 2012 as well as the temporary government for one year after 2003.
Table 5 GCPI staff numbers from 2005 to 2013

Years

Number of Staff

Notes

2003

7400

Additional stuff has joined to Iraqi ports under

2005

8600

order of the transport minister’s authority.

2010

9325

2013

12400

Source: GCPI, human resource department (personal communication)

2.8 OPERATIONAL DIFFICULTIES
Another serious challenge is with navigational control and Berthing control as well as
the connectivity of the berths in port with national hinterland to make the goods flow
smoothly. Smooth flow of goods is essential to the port of improvement performance
and competitiveness. Channel capacity with inappropriate depths, unreliable aids to
navigation and poor berth service, as there are several failures with cargo gears, are key
factors for the vessels to delay and prolong their time in the port.
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All these above reasons make the UQP an expensive port. As they are dissatisfied with
cost and inadequacy of the service according to the above factors, the cargo owners and
shipping lines have been enforced to use alternative ways to transport their cargo
overland as the total cost requires a high care for a whole supply chain system.
It can be inferred from above that competitiveness depends on a multitude of elements
used to achieve the port competitive advantage(s) among other competitors to be able to
attract clients, whereas the port should determine the problem causing the delay and not
give competitors opportunities to attract the clients.
In conclusion, studying all these above mentioned issues is necessary to solve the
problem in order to make the port operate efficiently and to be competitive. However,
focusing on the time in the port of a vessel is one of the most important indicators to
measure the quality of services in the port. Furthermore, there are limitations due to time
and availability of the data which it make impossible to cover all the issues mentioned
above.
The questionnaire methodology as well as the KPI analysis is used in order to identify
the problems and constraints that prolong the time of vessels in port. A questionnaire is
carried out by preparing inquiries to port users, and is supported through contact with
shipping lines and consignees.
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3

QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY ON UQP OPERATIONS

Port operation is classified by Frankel (1987) into “Waterfront Operations and Land
Operations. Waterfront Operations comprise navigational control, accommodation of
ships and floating equipment, loading and unloading of vessels, servicing of ships,
maintenance of ships, and marine operation administration.”
On the other hand he stated that “the Land Operations including cargo storage and cargo
processing interfacing transportation modes, and short term accommodation and
administration of passengers” (Frankel, 1987, p. 495)
Questionnaire as a quantitative research method is used to describe and analyze
responses on the basis of questioning of a proportion of a particular population to
measure performance of port operations, in this case in UQP, through the users of the
port.
32 questionnaires were distributed among the users of the port to involve the shipping
lines and agents, based on the same style of questionnaire on Dar-Es-Salaam Port that
created by Mkango (1997) with some addition of some items which are related to the
topic. An excel sheets and diagrams were made accordingly.
The response rate was 63%. The figures of questionnaire-respondent results are
organized on an excel sheet as shown in Appendix (2) to calculate the percentage of the
trend of the performance in the port and measure how efficient the port is. Moreover,
several phone calls with agents of UQP were made by the author in order to understand
the problems related to the time at the port. Although, they mentioned many issues that
hindering the speed of handling and corruption, the author is focusing on the areas
related to the topic in order to reach satisfactory results of this study.
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Evaluation of Safety of Navigation in the Port is the first question to the shipping lines
and agents, which draw a very clear impression of dissatisfaction with a high proportion
of poor and very poor assessments. A specific comment was made that new tugs and
pilot boats are required. Results are shown in the Figure (6).
Figure 6 Navigational Channel Assessments

Source: Questionnaire Respondent Results, Appendix 2
Availability of facilities is the second topic of assessment, which resulted in a variety of
responses including with poor and very poor response to availability of tug boats and
pilot vessels services as well as the draft depth. Comments show that there is a demand
for the Channel and berth to be dredged to reach the max 15 m draft. Figure (7) shows
the poor situation in the port.
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Figure 7 Availability of Facilities
Availability of facilities
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40.0
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20.0
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0.0
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Satisfactory

Poor

Very Poor

Source: Questionnaire Respondent Results, Appendix 2
Stevedores Performance and Conduct is the third issue presented to the users with high a
number of results in bad and very bad performance in the port although there is a little
bit of dissatisfaction with the discipline of the stevedores. In addition, they had
Comments that Laborer and Crane operators are not qualified and have no valid
certificates or licenses. Figure (8) shows the case of stevedore performance and conduct.
Figure 8 Stevedores Performance and Conduct
Stevedores Performance and Conduct
70.0

60.0

Percentage

50.0
Punctuali ty

40.0

Performance

Driver performance

30.0

Storage areas
20.0

10.0

0.0
Very Poor

Poor

Satisfactory

Good

Source: Questionnaire Respondent Results, Appendix 2
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Very Good

As mentioned in section 2.3, time in port of a vessel needs be broken down according to
port activities as shown in the Figure (4). Moreover, studying the existing facilities in
UQP, which are doing these activities as part of port operations will give a better
understanding for analysis of arrival and departure vessels according to the questionnaire
respondent results to determine at which stage the port has a problem to solve, and give
a solution to minimize the time in the port as much as possible to achieve differentiation
and efficiency for the port.
Port operations involve several activities which can be divided into land activities and
waterfront activities as classified by Frankel (1987). In line with the purpose of this
paper, the author will concentrate on the activities that influence the total turnaround
time in port of a ship to classify them into two parts namely, Navigation Control, Berth
Control as related to the UQP facilities and connectivity to the hinterland.
3.1 NAVIGATION CONTROL
The vessel will undertake several stages in its passage from the point where it passes the
sea (EOSP) to enter territorial Iraqi waters with the sea pilot into Khor Abdullah channel
to UQP, to be received finally by the harbour pilot to do operation of berthing with tug
boats.
3.1.1 WAITING AREA
The waiting area is located at the end of the channel of Khor Abdullah buoy # 1 next to
Al-Basrah Oil Terminal 4 Miles away as shown in Figure 9. It extends from buoy # 1
and is 10 miles long and 4 Miles wide. This anchorage area receives all the vessels
coming to UQP as well as other Iraqi ports. The pilot vessel is anchored at buoy #1 at
the end of this channel, and it takes an average time of about half to one hour for the
pilot to reach the vessel where it is anchored to wait its turn.
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In poor weather conditions, the pilot vessel anchors away from the waiting area to force
the UQP calling vessel entering the channel to come to buoy #1 or even buoy # 7,
causing risk and some delay in its passage when it stops again to pick up the pilot, rather
than the pilot embarking where the vessel anchors in the waiting area.
Furthermore, the pilot vessel is an old one, built in 1970, and experiences many
difficulties. It breaks down many times and has to be replaced by a tug boat coming
from UQP through the 50 mile channel of Khor Abdulla to reach the waiting area, which
takes an average time of about 5 to 6 hours .
Therefore, there is dissatisfaction with the pilot station vessel in the questionnaire
survey, which recorded responses of availability of facilities as a poor (41.2%), as
shown in Figure 7 and poor performance (47.1%), as shown in Figure 6.
Moreover, another source of delay for dry, bagging, cement, equipment carriers and
general cargo vessels is that they are required to have samples taken to be checked at
Iraqi labs, and to receive the analysis result takes a long time.
Furthermore, according to UQP management as told to the author, the Iraqi Government
has signed agreements with a number of international cargo inspection companies to
take samples of cargo before they arrive at port, but the cargo receiver requires another
inspection of the cargo which results in vessels waiting at the anchorage area to achieve
another delay, increasing the total time and the waiting time in particular.

31

Figure 9 UQP Anchorage Area

Source: HIS by AIS Live, (Traffic.Com, Live Map, 2013)
http://www.marinetraffic.com/ais/shipdetails.aspx

3.1.2 COMMUNICATIONS
UQP Radio coast station is an active unit at the port which connects all ships arriving to
the port for 24 hours. However, this station is working at the minimum with outdated
equipment. This station is the unit that has a data base on Excel for all vessels calling the
port but at the minimum of discrete data under personal skills while the management
office does not have any data base about its activities and still keeps paper records.
Moreover, the pilot vessel at the entrance to the channel has a person belonging to this
unit to transmit information related to the arrival of vessels and to coordinate the work.
Therefore, in the evaluation of Safety of Navigation, the Coast Station received a 52.9%
satisfactory response in the questionnaire results (see Figure 6).
3.1.3 PILOTAGE SERVICE
Pilotage is mandatory for UQP and, if required, is also conducted at night. The first step
is to allow the vessel to enter UQP; it must take permission from the Director of the
Port. The ship’s name, flag, IMO number, GRT, LOA, Draft, ETA, its location, course
and speed should be sent by the local agents to the Director of the Port by Fax, not less
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than 24 hours before the vessel enters Khor Abdullah’s waters. The report should be also
made on the VHF channel appropriate to the intended point of entry when the vessel
approaches to the port. When the vessel arrives, within 24 hours, its owner, local agent
or master should submit the documents to the Port Office (PO). However, all these data
are recorded in an old style by using paper documentation not IT system.
Pilotage service in UQP is a part of service for all ports. This unit is at the centre of the
GCPI building responsible for providing pilots to the vessels by pilot vessel at buoy
number 1 at the entrance of the Khor Abdullah channel, which connect to UQP and
other ports. There are always 8 pilots, at least, available in pilot vessel to receive the
arriving vessels while the unit in the centre of GCPI provides pilots for the departure
vessels. Pilots board the vessels near buoy 1 at the Khor Abdullah channel entrance to
lead them to UQP and vice versa. It is fair to find by the questionnaire survey a 41.2% a
satisfactory rating and 47.1% good rating on availability of pilots. However, there is
dissatisfaction with the pilot station vessel in the questionnaire survey, as mentioned in
section 3.1.1.
3.1.4 LIGHT AND BUOY SERVICE
Light and buoy service is a unit responsible for all activities relating to installing and
maintaining the lighting buoys in all Iraqi channels and ports. However, the war
damaged all its equipment and crane vessels belong to this unit except a Nasser salvage
vessel that was renewed by DANIDA in 2006 under donation of Danish Government. In
spite of this good project by DANIDA, many of buoys still experience problems related
to blackouts and go missing from channel as the unit has other missions to do as well to
extend to three channels namely, Khor Al Kafka, Shatt al-Arab or al-faw channel and
Khor Abdullah channel, the UQP access channel to UQP and KZP as well, resulting in
vessels having difficulties in dealing with traffic efficiency. As a result, the
questionnaire survey found responses to lighting systems varied according to the
performance of the Nasser vessels among the channels, as shown in (Figure 6).
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3.1.5 CHANNEL DEPTH SERVICE
There is a big unit responsible for maintaining and saving the depth of the channel at an
announced draft by GCPI for receiving ships calling in UQP and other Iraqi ports. It is
connected with GCPI away from UQP management. Except to provide simple
information to the harbour master or UQP managers, the dredging manager has no
responsibility to give real data to UQP management as the structure of the GCPI was
organized in the beginning of the foundation of the port. The situation is the same with
navigational, tug, lighting and salvage services as the management of the port is
separated away from these services to keep within the GCPI responsibility.
There is a draft limitation in the approach channel, 50 nautical miles from buoy 1 to
UQP with a width of 200m during low water tide, ranging from 7-10m. Therefore, the
GCPI has equipped this unit with multi-drudgers to maintain the average depths at
12.5m.
However, this unit was the GCPI unit that lost-the most equipment and vessels during
the wars when most of the dredgers were sinking and breaking down. Therefore, the
accumulated sedimentations cause a negative impact on the port where the volume and
size of the vessels at the port would therefore be declined. The shortage of the dredger
vessels leads to irregular dredging, which is considered a major constraint for the future
arrival of bigger ships and, therefore, hinders the competitiveness of UQP.
Therefore, by 2012 the permissible draft was reduced per order of the GCPI to less than
12.5m. However, due to a loan by the Japanese Government, the channel was dredged
and deepened again to 12.5m along all berths after 2012 through contract with a Belgian
company called Marine Belgium's Jan De Nul Group. It is one of three contracts entered
into the GCPI with a value of 70 million dollars and a corresponding value of the others
of 40 million and 35 million dollars after 2003. But, in spite of these efforts the tidal
range is vulnerable to sedimentation, as a result of sediments from the north Arabian
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Gulf, estimated by center of sea science in Basrah University to amount to about 1.8
million metric tons yearly.
Figure (10) shows fluctuations of dredging for mud loads monthly which support the
questionnaire results related to draft depth availability (Figure 7). Those fluctuations are
due to many break downs of the dredgers as a result of lack of spare parts which should
be provided by technical and financial committees. It takes a long time when they
provide the materials needed to repair the dredger vessels as well as the last month of the
year is the end of the accounting fiscal year for annual report where the Auditors’ Report
gives the financial situation of the company in accordance with acceptable accounting
principles. However, the old style that used in the GCPI related to the management
information system done on paper that took much time to fulfill its work.
Figure 10 Monthly Mud loads carried by dredgers in 2010

Source: Dredging Unit statistics, Appendix 3

According to the questionnaire survey the most complained about issues are the berth
draft as well as the access channel related to the problem of sedimentation in UQP and,
in particular UQPN, as a manmade river, causing delay of improvement of draft in the
channel even though the port recently bought modern dredgers to enhance their
equipment. About 64.7 % of respondent on shipping lines and agent questionnaire
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recorded as poor, depths of the channel, see (Figure 6) and 47.1% reported poor draft
depth availability of the channel (Figure 7).
The results trend toward the satisfaction of users when the port has improvements
number of dredger vessels affected by the break downs due to the shortage in the spare
parts. In addition, the satisfaction is reached in bringing the bigger vessels when the port
uses a private company to dredge the channel and fronts of the berths. However, this
situation is not prolonged any more as sedimentation is carried out every day into the
channel and the port.
3.1.6 BERTHING AND UNBERTHING SERVICE
This service involves the received vessels at the harbour limit by the harbour pilot to do
operations of berthing and unberthing. There is a unit responsible for these operations
which provides harbour pilots and organizes the movement of tugs and mooring
services. There is no problem with preparing the mooring team who are ready all the
times to tie up the vessels along the berth with two shifts weekly. Therefore 64.7% and
11.8% of respondents reported good and very good evaluation of service, respectively.
Reaching the harbour pilots to the vessels is very easy as a small boat or any tug boat
can pick up the pilot while the port is a river port and the limit of the harbour where the
harbour pilot embarks is not more than one mile away. Eventually, the harbour pilot
hands out the vessel to a sea pilot to direct her to sea through the access channel at buoy
# 1 along 50 miles away from the port and vice versa. However, the problem is with the
tugs, experiencing too many difficulties, as there is a shortage of tugs as well as a lack of
most spare parts and regular maintenance.
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3.1.7 TUG BOAT SERVICE
The tug boat service is the most important in the manoeuvering operations, in and out
which are in connection with the harbour pilot at all times. To complete the operation of
berthing or unberthing safely there should be at least 2 tugs as the current speed is very
high, in particular at UQPS. However, the port is suffering from this point as its tugs are
old and encounter several failures each day. As well as most of them were lost by the
war events. As such, tugs are frequently unavailable when a vessel comes to the port.
Therefore, the shipping lines and their agencies stated that there is a requirement for new
tugs and pilot boats as a result of the poor (70.6%) rating given to Tugging Services,
(see Figure 6). Furthermore, 47.1% they reported poor tug boats availability (see Figure
7).
3.2 BERTH CONTROL
This part involves the operation of handling of cargo from the time of sending the first
line of the ship to tie it to its berth and includes, in some cases, sampling of cargo, if it is
not done in anchorage area and cargo custom clearance procedures, until the vessel
leaves the berth. Therefore, it is better to understand the existing facilities in the UQP
and the other operations related to this stage to determine the constraints that are causing
delays and affecting the time in port in positive or negative ways in order to give the
appropriate solutions and make the operations go smoothly.
3.2.1 UQP FACILITIES
The facilities are found on the river at the end of Khor Abdullah channel and an
excavated tributary arm towards the northwest of Umm Qasr area south of Basrah city.
The facility is 5.2km long and consists of 22 berths and 2 Ro/Ro-berths including the
South port (UQPS) and the north port (UQPN). The total berth length of UQPS is about
1900 meters and the UQPN is about 2173 m long, including the new berth which is
200m long, for Ro/Ro & Passengers, built separately in 2010 as well as 2 berths recently
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added, under names 11 a and 11 b at the area near berth 11. Berth depths are 10 to 12.5
m. UQP handles multi-purpose and container cargo.
The port is equipped with 6 gantry cranes, 4 mobile cranes in container berths and quay
cranes and other equipment which is detailed in Tables (6 & 7) UQPS and UQPN
Facilities; however, in the multi-purpose berth they still use vessel cranes.
Figure 11 UQP Layout

Source: (JICA, 2012)
Interim Report, Data Collection Survey on Port Development Plan in Iraq

Two areas make up the port, namely, the UQPN and the UQPS. UQPS, the south port
area is located along the Navigational Channel. UQPN, the north port area continues
inside a widened and dredged man-made basin off the Navigational Channel and is
located northwest of the south port. They are handling containers, general cargo, grain
and other bulk as well as sugar and vegetable oil. The UQP recently comprises of a
container terminal (ICT) at area nearby berth 11 as there is space between berth 11 in
UQPS and berth 12 in UQPN to give a more space for receiving more vessels. These are
named berth 11a and berth 11b and are equipped with 2 second hand Mitsubishi STS
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gantry cranes. The ICT, a new expansion by GCPI that has operated under concession
on 31 Aug of 2012 by Gulftainer Inc., which has already been operating berth no. 8 in
UQPS.
Table 6 UQPS Facilities

Port

Bert
h

Commodities

UQP
S

1
2-3

Dry bulk,
break bulk
and sulphur
import
Containers
and multipurpose for
container and
general cargo
handling
Container and
break bulk

4

5

6-7
8

9

10
11
11a11b

Annual
Capacit
y x1000
250
500 tons

N. Crane

Dimension
s

Draft

Notes

2Jeep QCs

(201*25)m

12

Iraq Navy

12m

French
shipping
company
(CMA-CGM)
uses under the
concession.
Joint Venture
Martrade/Gaz
al

(400*25)m

500 tons

100,000
TEUs

break bulk
Container

500 tons
100.000
TEUs

Location of a
Turkish
power vessel
Grain
Storage silo
Gasoline
Container
(ICT), Iraq
Container
Terminal

-

45,000m
3 tons
250 tons
1000
tons

Using ships’
Cranes for
handling of
containers

(200*25)m

(2) of
40tons
Nelcon STS
gantry C
QCs
2 x 100t
Harbour
Mobil
cranesHMK280
-

(250*35)m

12.5
m

(350*20)m
(210*24)m

11.8
11.8
m

(168*25)m

9m

-

(280*30)m

Two Gantry
Cranes

(200*25)m
Terminal
area
approx.
300,000m²

12.5
m
11m
11m

Source: UQP management
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Concession
for Gulftainer

Engage by
Turkish power
vessel
Grain
Gasoline
concession for
Gulftainer
The operation
started 31
Aug. 2012

As shown in Table (6): berth # 1 is out of order through the navy force and lighting unit,
which has been using it for military purposes since 2003. However, a part from this
berth about 50- 75 m can be used when the harbour pilots need it.
Berth # 5 is used for container handling by a joint venture of Martrade and Gazal, while
berths no. 6 and 7 are used by the GCPI to handle break bulk and general cargo. In 2011,
mostly services of Maersk, Wan Hai Lines and Seacon were served at berth no. 5,
accounting for more than 100,000 TEUs.
Table 7 UQPN Facilities

Port

Berth

Commodities

Capacity

N. Cranes

Dimensions

Draft

UQPN

12-19

General cargo,
break bulk

2000tons
It means
each one
is equal
250tons

36 Q/C
were
installed in
1980 but
many of
them are not
working

12=188*25

9m

13=200*25

9m

14=200*25

9.5m

15=200*25

10m

16=240*25

10m

17=200*25

11m

18=200*25

11m

19=210*25

11.5m

(535*35)m

11.8m

Storage
yard is
crossed by
two rail
lines
Container
storage
yard

200m*25

11.8m

Vessel

20-21

Container

100.000
TUEs

(2)40tons
ZPMC STS
gantries
(2) New
Liebherr
Harbour

Notes
old
outdated
sheds
causing not
feasible for
container
operations

Mobile
Cranes
22

Ro/Ro &

250 tons

-

Passengers

Turn round
Location

Source: UQP management
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At UQPS, eight old and abandoned portal cranes are entirely out of order at berths no. 6
and 7, and Several Q/C were installed in 1980 at the UQPN but many of them are not
working and, therefore, need to be removed and scrapped in order to guarantee smooth
ship-to-shore operations.
According to Tables 8 and 9, At UQP, berths 4, 5, 8, 11 a, and 11 b are operated under
concessions contracts and a joint venture of work. However, berths 1 and 9 are occupied
by the Iraq Navy and a Turkish power vessel, which makes them out of the account of
port operations.
Privatization of the berths in the port is an effective way to develop the port facilities
and services. However, this has a negative impact on the other berths under government
performance, which are constrained by limited flexibility related to port activities,
especially in buying essential equipment when they need it as well as the long
bureaucratic formalities.
Moreover, there are disadvantages against the UQP facilities as there is old equipment
which needs to be renewed. Therefore, there is a high proportion of dissatisfaction with
the Type of Equipment/Gear with 41.2% of respondents rating it poor. The availability
of equipment and Cargo Gears also shows a clear poor trend (29.4%) as shown in Figure
(12).
Figure 12 Availability of Equipment and Cargo Gears
Equipment and Cargo Gear availavlity
60.0

50.0

Percentage

40.0
Type of Equipment/Gear

Portal C ranes

30.0

Forklifts
Container Cranes

20.0

10.0

0.0
Very Good

Good

Satisfactory

Poor

Source: Questionnaire Respondent Results, Appendix 2
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Very Poor

Another source of the delay for the vessels at UQP is the poor performance stevedores,
which appears obviously in the results of the questionnaire to record about 47.1% of
respondent on the shipping lines and their agencies questionnaire, poor performance
stevedores, and 64.7% reported poor driver performance as shown in (Figure 8).
Furthermore, the shipping lines and their agencies stated that Labourers and Crane
operators are not qualified and have no valid certificates or licenses.
As a result, all these factors will have a strong effect on the work in the port to decrease
the cargo handling productivity therefore, there is a need to renew this equipment along
with JICA projects and the port should sign an agreement with a socializing stevedoring
company for all cargo handling activities and making a good procedure to monitor their
performances.
3.2.2 HINTERLAND FROM SOUTH PORT (UQPS)
UQP is linked to the national Iraqi road and railway network serving the main cities in
Basrah and Baghdad, the capital of Iraq. The berths are accessed by truck via the main
gate of UQP. Rail tracks connect the port via Shouaiba junction where the area is west of
Basrah city. However, the national Iraqi road and railway networks are very old and
experienced several difficulties.
3.2.3 HINTERLAND OF UQP FROM NORTH PORT (UQPN)
The main gate at UQPN provides access to berth numbers 12 to 22. There is a gate
belonging to these berths, but unfortunately it is out of order.
At the end of the port facilities of Umm Qasr the berths number 20 and 21 are located
with approximately 450 m, which amounts to a quay apron width of some 80 m to a
36,000 m² concrete surfaced operational quay area. Two crane rails with a 30 m gauge
are crossing along the berths. In addition the berths have access to the railway network,
but the rails are not useful for operations as they are neglected and there are technical
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issues related to Iraqi Railways Corporation. Container vessel approximately 2,100 TEU
can be served at any time at the berths. They are operated by GCPI, equipped with 2
about 18 year old ZPMC STS gantry cranes, each with a capacity of 40tons.132,000m²
of ground area is available, which consists of a 36,000m² operational quays and a
96,000m² of yard storage area. However, with all these adequate storage spaces as the
north and south port of Umm Qasr consist of 160,000m² and of 800,000m² of open
storage area, there is still a problem to manage all the cargo and vessels. This is in line
with dissatisfaction of the users of the UQP who record rating of a very poor 23.5 % and
other fluctuated results can see in Figure 13:
Figure 13 UQP Storage Area Assessment
Managed Storage areas
35.0
30.0

Percentage

25.0

20.0
Storage areas

15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
Very Poor

Poor

Satisfactory

Good

Source: Questionnaire Respondent Results, Appendix 2
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Very Good

The other important factors that will have a strong effect on port productivity, which are
shown to have high dissatisfactory responses from the shipping lines and their agencies
based on the questionnaire, are documentation, container inspection area for custom list
preparation, and container loading list preparation to provide services in UQP Offices
with poorly performance and more delay to them (See Figure 14 and table 8). These
factors are called by Professor Ma as factors of production, which are the major driving
the force for trade (Ma, 2012, p. 7).
Figure 14 Observation of First in First served in providing service

Source: Questionnaire Respondent Results, Appendix 2
Table 8 Import Documentation Duration and Cargo Delivery

ITEMS
Current Maximum Duration Taking
Place within

Period
(5) days

(10) days

(15) days

17.6

11.8

52.9

(5) days

(5-8) days

29.4

0.0

47.1

(3) days

(2) days

(1) days

52.9

17.6

29.4

Minimum Duration Taking Place within (3) days
Ideal Duration for cargo delivery from
Users’ point of view?

Source: Questionnaire respondent results, Appendix 2
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All these reasons mentioned above have contributed to make the UQP more expensive
related to the time in the port which means the port management should implement
appropriate methods to minimize this time as it is related to the total cost.
Providing the port with appropriate equipment associated with dredging the channel is a
good strategy to attract users in proportion to the amount of cargo handling related to the
receiving the bigger vessels.
In conclusion, it can be inferred from the illustrations above that UQP has many
problems related to its facilities and procedures directly affecting the time at the port
which need to be reformed and renew. Development under a planning strategy by GCPI
is necessary to make the effective and efficient.
The port performance indicators related to the time of a vessel at the port will be used in
the next chapter as a profound analysis to support the results above to identify the
efficiency and competitiveness level and the performance of UQP.
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4

ANALISIS OF TIME-RELATED KPIs

4.1 INTRODUCTION
“The major purpose for collecting information to maintain performance indicators is to
provide management information for planning and control.” (UNCTAD, Port
Performance Indicators, TD/B/C.4/131/Supp.1/Rev.1).
In this section the author analyses the time in UQP of a vessel, using the characteristics
of the vessels and pattern of arrival and departure times to assess the efficiency of UQP
operation. By calculations of KPIs related to the time of vessel at port, starting with a
case study of two important vessels that came to the port in 2011. Several stages of time
from the vessel passing the sea (EOSP) to either dropping anchor in the waiting area to
wait for its turn in queue or proceeding direct to its berth to do its cargo operations of
loading or discharging until it returns back to this point are analyzed to determine the
bottlenecks of the flow of the cargo according to the collected data from the UQP.
Eventually, at the end of this chapter it is given an analysis implication on KPIs
outcomes are giving.
4.2 VESSELS’ CHARACTERISTICS
In UQP, located on the end of Khor Abdullah channel, is the largest river port in South
Basrah in Iraq, handling multi-purpose and container cargo. It is the life-blood for
economic growth in Iraq as mentioned in section 1.2.2. Figure 15 shows the cargo
handling in the port in three recent years (2010 to 2012) with an obvious upward trend,
in particular the containers and the grains.
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Figure 15 UQP handling per tons in 2010 to 2012
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Source: UQP Statistics, vessels calling UQP, Appendix 4

In spite of the increase in vessels in total Gross Tonnage (GT) of approximately +3.52%
in 2010 to 2012, to handle 3,020 vessels with an average of 1,007 vessels yearly to carry
about 25,470,364Gt of cargo with an average of about 8,490,121GT as shown in
Appendix 4, the Port experienced a downward trend in the number of vessels in this
period around -3.01%. This was a result of using a private company to dredge the berth
fronts in 2011 to 2012 within a period of 6 months under JICA projects to have deeper
channels of 12.5 meters after suffering from sedimentation limitations to receive bigger
vessels, enabling users to exploit the economics of scale by bigger vessels. Figure (16)
shows the number of vessels’ calls and their GT in the period 2010 to 2012.
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Figure 16 Number of vessels calling UQP in 2010 to 2012
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Source: UQP Statistics, vessels calling UQP, Appendix 4

The obvious opposite trends of the vessels and GT of cargoes means the users are using
bigger ships either to avoid the time cost as a bigger ship is less cost than the smallest
one in terms of commercial cost as their vessels stay more than the usual time in port.
Or, there are alternative ports attracting the vessels that come to UQP.
4.3 ANALYSIS SHIP TIME IN CASE STUDY
Several statements of facts have been provided by local agents in UQP during the
writing of the research which contained all the data related to port operations to both of
the water front and land side. The author has selected two grain and sugar vessels as
case studies which were coming to the most important agencies namely, Barwil and
Inchcape. These vessels are calculated as representative of most vessels staying a long
time in the port compared with other vessels, such as container vessels.
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4.3.1 M/V SIREEN-B
M/V SIREEN-B is a bulk carrier that entered the UQP in 2011 February, 11 by
BARWIL Agency by WILHELMSEN Ship Service in Iraq as shown in the Appendix 3.
It proceeded to berth 15 in UQP north berths with her voyage number 1 at the date above
with a Sugar cargo of 18,000 mts gross to record 16 days and 6 hours of turnaround
time even though the vessel was in direct proceed order to the port UQP.
The vessel's characteristics: Port of registry: Kingstown, IMO number: 8214906, Year
Built: 1984, length x Breadth: 152 m X 24 m, speed recorded (Max / Average): 14.8 /
11.9 knots, flag: St Vincent Grenadines, 4 Holds, Hatches: 4 Hatches Macgregor,
Gear: 3 Carnes x 25 Tons / 1 Derrick x 25 Tons. Flag: St Vincent Grenadines -

.

Last Position Received is Area of Black Sea (Traffic.Com, Live Map, 2013).
In Table (9) calculations are made according to the case study in lecture hand-outs 2013
of Professor Moon:
Table 9 Calculations of Time in Port of M/V SIREEN-B

Mints
22185.00
1503.00
642.00
20055.00
4395.00
15625.00
21.9%
7.5%

Items
Average time in port
Average waiting time
Average manoeuvring time
Average service/berth time
Average productive time
Average idle time
Average productive ratio (%)
Grade of waitng (or Ave Waiting Rate) (%)
Source: BARWIL Agency document

Hrs
369.75
25.05
10.70
334.25
73.25
260.42
0%
0%

Days
15.41
1.04
0.45
13.93
3.05
10.85
0.02%
0%

Before analyzing the data of this vessel, it is better to give a reason why this vessel was
chosen among other vessels that were delayed as well. It was selected for many reasons.
Firstly, according to UQP statistics, it came to UQP twice. The first time was from
February 11, 2011 to February 27, 2011, which will be studied now, and the second time
was from October 09, 2011 to October 27, 2011, which was the last time it visited the
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UQP. Secondly, the vessel was an example of the port working with a 7 hours break
time, each day. Finally, it is an example of when UQP was taking samples of cargo from
vessels alongside berths to enforce vessels waiting for more than three days until the
analysis result was received.
Figure 17 Main elements of TRT of M/V Sireen-b

M/V SIREEN-B TURNAROUND TIME IN UQP
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Source: Barwil Agency document

Let’s start with productivity time and idle time as the most important in the port
operation then back to analyzing the waiting time as the most significant element in total
time in the port. From Figure (17) it is clear that idle time dominated on the productivity
time as the idle time equaled 11.7 days while the productivity time is equal to only 3
days since cargo handling have not been 24 hours as the break time stopping the work of
labors during the day i.e., the vessel has berthed but labors were not ready to work. In
other words, the human resources should be studied and identified. Another factor that
affects the productive time directly is the shortage of trucks. Many times there were no
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trucks to receive the cargo during the work. GCPI should optimize the availability of
truck immediately by to solve this problem; otherwise, the productivity at UQP
operations will suffer from too much idle time.
Therefore, the Service Time was about 14 days. It is a natural result due to excessive
idle time in the port.
Grade of Waiting with 7.5% was reasonable as the vessel did not take a sample in the
anchorage area. The major part of waiting time is a sample taken for checking the cargo
by Port Authority. However, for this vessel the case was changed from taking the sample
in the anchorage area to when the vessel went alongside its berth as shown in appendix
5-b.
Maneuvering Time was about 10 hours and 42 minutes since there is a channel 50 miles
long plus 10 miles of anchorage area, it is reasonable according to her average speed
11.9 knots ( 60/11.9 x 2=10.08) taking into consideration the age of the vessel that built
in 1984.
4.3.2

M/V CAPTAIN HARRY

M/V Captain Harry, a bulk carrier entered UQP in 2011 January, 08 through Inchcape
Agency in Iraq as shown in the Appendix (6-a), (6-b). It was carrying 40045.113 MT
bulk rice from Darrow, LA/USA.
The author has selected this vessel for many reasons. Firstly, it was coming to UQP only
one time in January 11, 2011 and left in February 15, 2011, which was to be the last time
it visited the UQP. Secondly, for the port, the vessel was a sample for working within 24
hours a day. Finally, it is an example of when UQP was taking samples of cargo when
the vessels were outside of berths, to enforce a waiting time of more than three days
until the analysis was result received. However, the case was worse for other dry,
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bagging general cargo and other vessels which spent more than a month as it will be
seen in the next sections.
Vessel's characteristics by (Traffic.Com, Live Map, 2013)
Port of registry: Kingstown, IMO number: 9451173, MMSI: 311041400, Year Built:
2010, Length x Breadth: 190 m X 32 m, speed recorded (Max / Average): 10.8 / 10.1
knots, flag: St Vincent Grenadines, 4 Holds, Hatches: 4 Hatches Macgregor, Gear: 3
Carnes x 25 Tons / 1 Derrick x 25 Tons. GT: 33194, DWT: 57266 t. and her
Flag: Bahamas-

. Last position is in area of Indian Ocean.

In Table (10) calculations are made also according to the case study in lecture hand-outs
2013 of Prof. Moon:
Table 10 Calculations of Time in Port of M/V CAPTAIN HARRY

Mints
54400.00
36710.00
602.00
17123.00
11581.00
5507.00
67.6%
214.4%

Items
Average time in port
Average waiting time
Average manoeuvring time
Average service/berth time
Average productive time
Average Idle Time
Average productive ratio (%)
Grade of waitng (or Ave Waiting Rate) (%)

Hrs
906.67
611.83
10.03
285.38
193.02
91.78
1%
4%

Days
37.78
25.49
0.42
11.89
8.04
3.82
0.05%
0%

Source: Inchcape Agency document

With this vessel the case was changed to the better situation in port operations where the
productivity ratio was 67.6% while the idle time was 32% only. However, there were
many stoppage cases during the handling operations as shown in Appendix (6) due to
break down of hoppers or unavailability of the trucks as well as weather conditions, also
within the idle time. However, the stops did not involve all holds of the vessel, if taking
into accounts these partial stops, the productivity will be affected to be less than 8 days.
The worst is the waiting time with 25 days and 11.5 hours with trouble Grade of Waiting
time (GW) to equal 214.3% due to sample taken, as the agent of the vessel mentioned by
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telephone through the questionnaire survey analyzed in chapter 3. He said it was taken a
sample for checking and the analysis results for the vessel were not received until this
trouble period pass to reach about 25 days and 11 hours.
Figure 18 Main elements of TRT of M/V Captain Harry

M/V CAPTAIN HARRY TURNAROUND TIME IN UQP
30.00

25.49

25.00

Days

20.00
15.00
8.04
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0.00
Waiting Time

Manoeuvering Time

Productive Time

Idle Time

Source: Inchcape Agency document

To analyze the waiting time from Table (18), it is clear that the waiting time dominated
the productive time and other port times. However, the productive time was better than
the idle time as it was 3 days while the productive time was 8 days.
In spite of improvement of productive time, there was a big problem with the waiting
time as a result of not receiving the analysis of sample results of the cargo from the trade
ministry representatives under the health authority in Baghdad, about 500 km away from
Basrah, as well as the distance of the channel from UQP about 50 miles using a small
boat to reach the vessel.
However, the situation is different in case of calculations of average time for all vessels
for period of monthly or yearly time. In addition, the case is very different with
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container vessels in terms of waiting time and other items. As the cargo has no analyzed
samples to wait for the berths have high speed handling by gantry and the mobile cranes,
as mentioned in Tables (6) and (7) as new equipment, to minimize the time so there is
little or no downtime.
4.4 AVERAGE TIME ‘AT’ IN THE PORT
The average time in the port of the vessels is a summation of the entire vessel times
calling the port monthly, quarterly or yearly as a way to measure the performance of the
port to give an indicator to identify the bottlenecks in port operations in order to develop
appropriate solutions accordingly. However, according to available data of 2011, it was
limited to calculate only Average Waiting Time, Average Service or Berthing Time and
Average Time at the Port TRT.
4.4.1 AVERAGE TIME IN THE BERTS 20-21 IN UQPN
The average time in berths 20-21 as a container terminal in 2008 is 6.85 days. Average
Waiting Time (AWT) is 12.5 hours while the Average Idle Time (AIT) is 2.71 days and
the Average Productive Ratio (APR) was 57.2%. Which means the berths are suffering
from difficulties in much idle time and waiting time, affecting berth productivity
negatively as Table (11) and Figure (19) show.
Table 11 Time in UQP: Berths 20-21, Container Terminal
Container Ves s els Tim es in UQ P-Berths 20-21 in 2008
Items

Days

average time in port
average waiting time

(ATP )

6.85

(AWT)

0.52

average berth time
average productive time

(ABT)
(APT)

6.33

average idle time

(AIT)

2.71

average productive ratio

(APR)
(AGW)

0.02

average grade of waiting

Source: UQP management statistics
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3.62

0.00

Figure 19 Main elements of TRT in UQP in Berths 20-21
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Source: UQP management Statistics

4.4.2 AVERAGE TIME IN UQP IN 2011 AT VESSEL SIZE GROUPS
The average time in UQP for 22 berths in 2011 was better than 2008, in particular in the
container terminals, as there is good handling equipment to reduce the idle time and no
analyses of samples for the cargo as the case of dry cargo vessels. However, it did not
match with requirements of users to satisfy international standards, or even compared
with neighbouring ports. Therefore, it is better to classify vessels according to the cargo
they carry as mentioned in handouts of Professor Moon 2003, Port Logistics and
Planning as follow:
1. Bulk Cargo
a. Dry bulk cargo: Grain, Coal and Ore Carriers
b. Liquid bulk cargo: Petroleum, Product oil, Chemical products, and
liquefied gas Carriers
2. Break-bulk Cargo: General Cargo
a. Container Cargo: Containerships
b. Passenger, Car and Truck Ships
c. General Cargo Ships, and other general cargo ships
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However, the author classified the ships calling UQP in 2011 into dry bulk and bagging
cargo carriers to involve the grain, rice and sugar ships, break-bulk carriers to involve
the container ships, and the general and other cargo ships to involve the general cargo,
passenger, car and truck, equipment, and cement ships in accordance approximately of
the long stay in the UQP. There was a shortage of data related to the port operations, in
particular the handling of the cargo, to exclude the Average Idle Time (AIT) and
Average Productive Ration (APR). However, it shared the important elements of time in
port like the ATP, AWT, ABT and AGW.
4.4.3 AVERAGE TIME IN DRY BULK AND BAGGING CARRIERS
The average time of dry bulk and bagging carriers in UQP in 2011 is 21.25 days.
Average Waiting Time (AWT) is 10.57 days, while the Average service Time (ABT) is
10.31 days; the Average Grade of Waiting (AGW) was 102.5% hours which supporting
the results in the M/V SIREEN-B and CAPTAIN HARRY to give the clear picture that
the most delays in the UQP occur with these vessels types due to the analysis of cargo to
take samples procedures as well as the breakdown of the equipment. These results are
shown in Table (12) and Figure (20) for the important elements of time in port as
follows:
Table 12 Time in UQP: Dry bulk and bagging Carriers in 2011

Dry bulk Carriers Time related to KPIs
ATP (hours)
AWT (hours)
ABT (hours)
APT (hours)
AIT (hours)
APR
AGW

average time in port
average waiting time
average berth time
average productive time
average idle time
average productive ratio
average grade of waiting

510.1
253.7
247.5
247.5
0.0
100.0%
102.5%

Source: UQP- Coastal Station Unit Statistic
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DAYS
21.25
10.57
10.31
10.31
0.00
0.04
0.04

ATP (Days)
AWT (Days)
ABT (Days)
APT (Days)
AIT (Days)
APR
AGW

Figure 20 Mail elements of TRT of dry and bagging Carriers in UQP in 2011
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Source: UQP- Coastal Station Unit Statistic

4.4.4 AVERAGE TIME IN BREAK-BULK: CONTAINER CARGO
The average time of break-bulk carriers: container cargo in UQP in 2011 is 104.2 hours.
Average Waiting Time (AWT) is 7.5 hours while the Average service time is 87.2 hours
(3 days and 15.2 hours) and the Average Grade Waiting (AGW) was 9.1% to illustrate a
good improvement compared with 2008, as a result of the progress of the JICA projects
and other private joint venture berths. Table (13) and Figure (21) show the important
elements of time in port as follows:
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Table 13 Time in UQP: Break-bulk: Container Vessels in 2011

DAYS

B reak bul k : Cont s V s l s Ti m e rel at ed t o K P Is

ATP (hours) average time in port

104.2

AWT (hours) average waiting time

7.9
87.2
87.2
0.0
100.0%
9.1%

ABT (hours)
APT (hours)
AIT (hours)
APR
AGW

average berth time
average productive time
average idle time
average productive ratio
average grade of waiting

4.34
0.33
3.63
3.63
0.00
0.04
0.00

ATP (Days)
AWT (Days)
ABT (Days)
APT (Days)
AIT (Days)
APR
AGW

Source: UQP- Coastal Station Unit Statistics
Figure 21 Main elements of TRT of Container vessels in UQP in 2011
Break Bulk Cargo: Container Vsls Time in UQP in 2011
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Source: UQP- Coastal Station Unit Statistics

4.4.5 AVERAGE TIME IN GENERAL CARGO & OTHER VSLS
The average time in break-bulk: the general cargo and other vessels in UQP in 2011 are
13.86 days. Average Waiting Time (AWT) is 8.22 days while the Average Berth
(Service) Time (ABT) is 5.22 days and the Average Grade Waiting (AGW) was 157.4%
which means the situation is quite bad in terms of the delay of the vessels at the port due
to several reasons. First, the cement, equipment carriers and general cargo have had
samples taken to check at Iraqi labs and to receive the analysis result took a long time.
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Secondly, the old Quay Cranes are another reason for delays as they always have
downtimes during work. The stevedore activities have bad performance as well as the
unavailability of trucks as seen in the cases of SIREEN-B and CAPTAIN HARRY
vessels. These results in Table (14) and Figure (22) show the important elements of time
in port as follows:
Table 14 Time in UQP: Break-bulk, General Cargo and other Vessels in 2011

G eneral Cargo & other v s ls related to KPIs
ATP (hours)
AWT (hours)
ABT (hours)
APT (hours)
AIT (hours)
APR
AGW

average time in port
average waiting time
average berth time
average productive time
average idle time
average productive ratio
average grade of waiting

332.7
197.2
125.3
125.3
0.0
100.0%
157.4%

DA Y S

13.86
8.22
5.22
5.22
0.00
0.04
0.07

Source: UQP- Coastal Station Unit Statistics
Figure 22 Main elements of TRT of G Cargo & other vessels in UQP in 2011
Break-bulk: G Cargo & other VslsTime in UQP in 2011
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Source: UQP- Coastal Station Unit Statistic
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APT (Days)
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4.4.6 AVERAGE SERVICE TIME IN UQP IN 2005 TO 2013
The ABT of vessels fluctuated (6.5 to 12.5 days) from 2005 to 2013 as Figure (23)
shows. The highest period was in 2005 followed by a slight decrease in time to record a
good improvement, as an increase in number of containers to speed up the handling
operations in the port within the year followed the concession for Gulftainer and other
private companies. As a result, there are obvious improvements in trends of service time.
Figure 23 UQP Service Time in 2005 to 2013
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4.4.7 UQPS AND UQPN ANNUAL IMPROVEMENT
In 2012 the gross tonnage (GT) in North and South UQP in total was 9,335,000:
4,606,285GT by UQPN and 4,658,008 by UQPS see Figure 24.
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Figure 24 UQPN & UQPS cargoes in GT in 2012
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In number of vessels, in 2012, the UQPN recorded about 502 vessels and the UQPS only
about 420 vessels. Also there was a sharp decline in gross tonnage in UQPN and UQPS
in April due to the fact that the trade ministry finishes its contracts for the transportation
of the cargoes in March and has to renew the contracts in April as the Figures (24) and
(25) show.
Figure 25 Number of Vessels Calling UQPN & UQPS in 2012
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In spite of fluctuations in of the trend lines in GT and Number of vessels, it could be
noted that the north port of UQP is more improved although there are no private
investments, like the South of UQP which has privatisation of contracts such as berth # 4
a by French shipping company (CMA-CGM), berth # 5 by Joint Venture Martrade/Gazal
and berth # 8 by Gulftainer, for handling containers. When searching in the data and
analyzing the information through discussions with the staff of GCPI and the agents as
well, it appears that the qualification of the staff is the most important factor to increase
this growth compared with south port. A key factor in the growth of the North port has
been its manager, who graduated from WMU in 2010, and began managing UQPN at
the end of 2011.
4.5 ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATION ON KPIs OUTCOMES
As defended above, the time in port is a summation of the time of the vessel in the port
to give good indicators to measure port performance. But, with limitation of availability
of the data, it may be difficult to reach all the stages of turnaround time of the vessel in
UQP which are shown in section 5.3. However, the Average Time at the Port (ATP),
The Average Waiting Time, average berthing or serving time (AWT), average
productive time (APT), average idle time (AIT) and Average Grade Waiting (AGW) are
the main elements of time of the vessels in the port that, which was calculated to come
in line with the purpose of this study, as it is related to the time of the vessel in the port
according to the years provided by GCPI.
Although some analysis is given in the above explanations, it is better to pass deep
analysis on the main elements of the turnaround time of the vessel in UQP in accordance
with the previous sections and data provided by UQP management as follow:
4.5.1 AVERAGE TIME IN PORT (ATP)
The ATP is a summation of the time of the vessel in the port for all items mentioned in
section 4.5. The ATP in 2008 at the CT of berth 20-21 fluctuated from 1.3 days to 16
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days and in some cases exceed 27 days, with the average being 6.85 days. However, the
situation was quite good in 2011, even with all berths used to handle container cargo,
compared with 2008. ATP ranged from 0.5 days (12 hours) to 16.9 days with an average
of 4.3 days, which gives a good impression about improvement to the port efficiency the
difference in ATP between 2008 and 2011, is mainly attributable to a higher number of
container vessels being able to proceed directly to berth rather than waiting in the
anchorage area in 2011.
Unfortunately, the case was worse with dry bulk carriers, bagging cargo vessels, general
cargo and other vessels in multipurpose berths, except the passenger and car ships. ATP
in dry bulk and bagging cargo ships fluctuated through the months in 2011 from 9.1
days to more than a month with AT about 21.3 days due to the waiting time for samples
of cargo, and several stops in the equipment in the port as well as the unavailability of
trucks for the handling of the cargo.
4.5.2 AVERAGE WAITING TIME (AWT)
Waiting time in UQP is a summation of time in the anchorage area where the vessel is
anchored to wait its turn in a queue until it anchors up to proceed to buoy # 1 to pick up
the pilot in the anchorage area nearby the Al-Basrah oil terminal.
The largest part of AWT is time waiting for a berth for general cargo, sugar, grains and
rice vessels. They spend more than 10 days and in some cases about a month as it was
seen in the Captain Harry vessel mentioned above. However, with container vessels the
case is better than others due to the quick handle operations there, and no samples of
cargo taken.
Vessels in the anchorage area that they had to wait due to the analysis sample results
spent more time in the waiting area to get permission to proceed to the berth. Moreover,
especially for multipurpose berths, vessels already on berth for unloading cargo often
endured waiting time because trucks to load in were not available or not ready in the
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port in addition to breakdowns of cranes; these factors combined caused the vessels to
have to spend a long time in the anchorage area.
Furthermore, waiting time was affected by inefficient procedures to take and analyze
samples of grains, sugars, rice and other general cargo, in some cases adding more than
one month to the vessel waiting time. However, the situation is changing these days by
following a new policy as the trade ministry announced to analyze the samples in the
United Emirates in Dubai rather than in Iraqi labs which have poor equipment. But,
unfortunately, sometimes samples taken more time to Iraqi labs cause additional delay to
the vessel time due to cargo inspection. Sometimes the cargo contains 10 kinds of sugar
and is stacked in a way that it cannot be inspected at once.
The health authority takes the sample of cargo which is close to the hatch cover and
when the results come out they allow this cargo to be unloaded. Then another sample of
cargo appears which needs to be inspected. This happens with different types of cargo,
especially with sugar and rice ships. As the case with M/V SIREEN-B and CAPTAIN
HARRY, these vessels are taken as examples of the worst cases in the port as they
greatly influence the calculations of the total time in the port on average.
4.5.3 AVERAGE MANEUVERING TIME (AMT)
As mentioned in section 3.1.5, there is a draft limitation of the approach channel, which
is 50 nautical miles from buoy 1 to UQP with a width of 200m during low water tide,
ranging from 7-10m. However, the GCPI has equipped this unit with multi dredgers to
maintain the average depth at 12.5m. Therefore, this situation might be affected by the
fluctuations of dredger vessel performance which forced the GCPI by 2012, to reduce
the permissible draft to less than 12.5m. The case may be worse only with bigger ships
but will affect the productivity of the berths. As a result, the MT for any vessel entering
the Khor Abdullah Channel is approximately 10 hours, as was seen by the M/V
SIREEN-B (10 hours and 42 minutes) and CAPTAIN HARRY (10 hours and 3
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minutes), and the situation was the same with vessels in 2011, fluctuating between 10 to
12 hours.
4.5.4 AVERAGE BERTHING OR SERVING TIME (ABT)
The ABT of vessels fluctuated (6.5 to 12.5 days) from 2005 to 2013 as Figure 23 shows.
The highest period was in 2005 followed by a slight decreasing in this time to record a
good improvement, with an increase in the number of container berths to speed up the
handling operations in the port, followed by the concession for Gulftainer and other
private companies.
4.5.5 AVERAGE PRODUCTIVE TIME (APT) AND AVERAGE IDLE
TIME (AIT)
APT for a grain, or dry bulk cargos, sugar and rice, as bagging cargo vessels, as well as
the container vessels was unsatisfactory in terms of APT compared with AIT. For
example in case of M/V SIREEN-B with sugar cargo, the APT was 3 days while there
were 10 days and 20 hours of Idle time due to several reasons. Stops happened because
no trucks were available, and Cranes were out of order In addition, break times and stops
for rain and bad weather to avoid damaging of the cargo added to AIT. Furthermore,
stevedoring activities were still done by ship cranes, leading to low productivity, and an
increase in the average time at the port of the multipurpose berths.
In the Container Terminal of 20-21 berths in 2008, the productive time fluctuated but
when the average time improved compared with idle time. However, the improvement is
not a satisfactory with competitive level, as the APT is equal to 3.62 while the AIT is
equal 2.71. However, the situation improved in 2011 in these berths compared with
2008.
In the multipurpose berths for bagging cargo, dry bulk and general cargo, the situation is
worse as most Quay Cranes were installed in 1983 and have several downtimes during
the work. In case of the M/V SIREEN-B, it is the worst example of work at the port,
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when productive time was 3.05 days, while the idle time was 10.85 days as there were
many downtimes in the equipment of the port.
In spite of some improvements in the average time in container terminals and other
multipurpose berths in UQP , there was still inefficient time related to the idle time as a
result of more holidays in the year, no trucks, break times, lack of planning between the
port and vessels, direct discharge to the trucks and a very small proportion going to the
storage area and there are no port trucks to use to transport the containers to the yards,
which means the port uses a forklift for this purpose.
In other words, there are good gantry cranes to clear the ships-to-shore, but there are
inefficient and lack of equipment to lift the containers away to the storage areas when
there are no trucks to load and discharge containers or other cargo in the multi-purpose
berths. Forklifts and other essential equipment are very important to secure the flow of
containers from the ship to shore; otherwise it causes much idle time to delay the vessels
and maximizes time in the port. However, with limitations of data, as mentioned above,
some port operations are (for example) not calculated, the (BOR), (CUR) and Labor
Utilization Ration (LUR), in order to indicate the labour and crane productivity.
4.5.6 AVERAGE GRADE WAITING TIME (AGW)
The case with Average Grade Waiting in container berths is different than multipurpose
berths, as there is quick handling of cargo. However, it was quite high in 2011, at 9.1%
which means there is too much idle time resulting in a low productivity case in the
handling of the cargo.
4.6 SIGNIFICANT WAYS TO IMPROVE THE TIME IN UQP
(Alderton, 2005, p. 189) Stated that “Minimizing the time a ship spends in port will now
be virtually every port manager’s priority. This priority increases as ships grow in size
and capital intensity and ports face increasing competition for customers.” Therefore, the
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GCPI should be concerned about the long time spent by vessels; otherwise it will be
weak to achieve and sustain the efficiency and development needed.
According to Professor Moon in his lecture handouts of 2013, there are four ways to
reduce waiting time cited from Venus Lun, Lai and T.C. Edwin Cheng (2006), as
follows:
1. Increase the berth capacity: the number of berths
2. The relation of ‘Delay Ratio’ with ‘BOR’
3. Increase the working time at berths
4. Increase the terminal cargo-handling productivity
There is no problem related to the number of the berths in UQP. However, the remaining
ways are highly required to reduce the waiting time and increase the productivity in the
port. Changing the method of working into two-shifts instead of daywork plus overtime
is a better way to reduce the time of the vessels at the port, as introduced in 1981 in the
port of Hull in United Kingdom, a below-average productivity rate per day in the port of
Hull by comparison with competing ports (particularly on the east coast of the United
Kingdom and North Continent) is the one of the prime factors of contributing to improve
the productivity per day, and enhance ship turnround time by at least 70/80 per cent.
(UNCTAD/SHIPP/494(1), 1983)
Moreover, applying the IT system with Vessels Traffic Services (VTS) within the port
area are most essential to the UQP to organize all its activities to save ship time as a
result of saving the time in the port, as it would record all the values to enable the
technical personnel to find the bottlenecks and other issues are required to carry out any
plan for an investment in the port in which the port should achieve its services within
standard international port levels.
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5

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 CONCLUSTION
A pillar of the national economy is the port, not only as a gateway for entry of cheaper
prices compared with other transportation modes but also as a source of revenue to the
government and a means for other country activities which will be delayed if the port
has inadequate functions to receive the cargo. The hospital, for example, will not render
a service to the people if its medicines are delayed in the port, the building will not be
completed by the engineer on time in the case that the port is not able to flow the cargo
of his building materials smoothly, as planned.
Therefore, the Iraqi government should give higher care to make their ports work
effectively and efficiently to secure the most country activities, as 90% of world trade
depends on transporting goods by water. On the other hand, the GCPI as a port authority
should pay special attention to the time factor at port by making a good planning
strategy and taking effective steps to be efficient to meet with the demand of the
country.
The main objective of this research was to study the turnaround time in the UQP to find
the problems that prolong the time of vessels and to recommend solutions for these
problems and constraints related to time/cost in order to be more efficient and effective
within a shorter total time in port of a vessel. By doing so, it will be more attractive for
users, which will increase the number of vessels calling this port and, therefore, result in
more revenue for the port and more benefits to the users as well.
To achieve the above objective, the author used an analysis of the time at port of a
vessel, Turnaround time, through a literature review to study significant previous
research, reports and conferences, which have developed the subject.
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A questionnaire was carried out by preparing inquiries to ports’ clients in order to
support research findings through contacting shipping lines and consignees. The port
performance indicator was used with available data to provide a profound analysis to
identify how the port operated in effective and efficient ways to support the
developments needed.
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations are classified according to the previous chapters into three parts:
navigation, berthing and land control to minimize the time in UQP.
5.2.1 NAVIGATIONAL CONTROL
To minimize time in the navigational channel at UQP, involving the maneuvering in the
channel and at the anchorage area, embarking and disembarking the sea pilot and
harbour pilot and the berthing and unberthing operations, it is necessary to break down
the activities of the stages of transferring the vessels from on stage to another.
5.2.1.1

WAITING TIME

In UQP, there are two crucial elements of the waiting time that have a direct impact on
the time in the port that should be minimized. The first factor is taking samples of the
cargo when the vessel is anchored. This case involves the general cargo, grain, sugar and
rice vessels, by trade ministry representatives under health authority, and should be
converted into a modern way to be suitable with respect to time in port.
Although, the Iraqi Government has signed agreements with a number of international
cargo inspection companies to take samples of cargo before they arrive to port, the cargo
receiver requires another inspection of the cargo which results in vessels waiting at the
anchorage area or in some cases at the berth to achieve another delay, increasing the
total time and the waiting time in particular.
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Therefore, the consignees have to rely on the results of these international inspectors in
order to allow ships to berth on arrival and avoiding delays for second inspection. The
lab used for analysis of the cargo should be equipped with modern devices to give quick
results; it should be at Basrah or UQP instead of Baghdad, 500 Km plus a 50 mile
channel away. The other factor affecting the waiting time is the idle time in the berths
when the vessels waiting at berth for sample results, or due to the equipment breakdown
and unavailability of the trucks as a result the vessel is occupying the berth with idle
time, making the berth unavailable to other vessels.
Therefore, it is necessary to reduce the idle time by making sure the trucks are ready
when the handling operation is in progress. Increasing terminal cargo handling
productivity by optimizing the stevedoring activities can be assisted by using port’s
modern cranes rather than the cranes of the vessels for all cargo handling activities.
An efficient truck control system should be implemented to avoid uncertainty and delays
of lack of trucks and better turnaround time for trucks not only in the port but at all
destinations. Further, the port should select a competent trucking company to avoid
losing time which increases costs in the port for its clients.
In other words it is highly required to solve, the breakdown of the cranes and trucks
through outsourcing to private companies to secure these services in a good and timely
manner to avoid the high cost of vessels spending more time in the port.
5.2.1.2

MANEUVERING TIME

This stage involves the time when the vessel passes the sea (EOSP) enter to the
anchorage area to drop anchor in case it has not direct order, and the time when the
vessels enter the access channel to proceed to berths through the Khor Abdullah Channel
and vice versa.
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The pilot station at buoy # 1 should be able to reach the anchored vessels rather than
forcing them to stop many times to pick up the sea pilot onboard. The pilot vessel should
order the coming vessel to drop anchor with suitable distance and easy access to the
channel, which should be approved by Vessels Traffic Services ‘VTS’ as well as the port
area. With IT system, scheduling in advance can be achieved.
Regular maintenance of the buoys is advised to avoid blackouts for long periods of time
and avoid giving rise to a bad reputable to the channel.
Due to the problem of sedimentation related to the draft in UQP in particular, UQPN is
required to take real steps through GCPI and a Consultant firm as they did in 2008, with
DANIDA. But unfortunately this was refused by GCPI because of the navigational
hazards when the consultant proposed to reduce the mouth of the river to the North port
(UQPN).
Dumping of dredged materials by dredger vessels about 1 to 3 miles away from the UQP
in the channel of Khor Abdullah is a major problem in the author’s opinion causing the
delay of improvement of draft in the channel even though the port recently bought
modern dredgers to enhance its equipment. Furthermore, the downtimes of the dredger
vessels have affected the annual rate as well. As a result, it is necessary to optimize the
berth depths by dredging the quay in such a way as to best accommodate bigger vessels
for the expected traffic flow over the channel. Therefore, it is needed to carry out annual
dredging works in both of the access channels and the berth fronts through a dredging
strategy.
The tug boat service and pilot station vessel are the most important in the manoeuvering
operations, in and out which are in connection with the sea and harbour pilots to do the
berthing and unberthing operations. The port is suffering from this point as its tugs and
pilot vessel are old and encounter several failures each day. Therefore, the GCPI should
take care about this service as it affects the time in the port of the vessels directly.
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5.2.2 BERTH CONTROL
Handling operations are a part of berth services rendered by the port that should be made
available full-time rather than cut off by break downs of port cranes or break time for
laborers and unavailability of trucks and other required services to the vessels. Using the
method of two shifts in a day and night time will optimize the berth productivity and
minimize idle time to give good effects to minimize the waiting time. Securing good
equipment on the berth will avoid excessive delays and enable ships to save time as they
may engage in supply chain under the method of Just-In-Time, used by several
companies to encourage them to come to the port. The working hours at the berth should
be increased as the management should increase the labor productivity.
Moreover, quality of service is improved by rendering a good service and ensuring
availability of the trucks and other essential equipment for the vessels to contribute to
minimizing the total time in port. For example, if the port gives a service of bunkering,
repairing or waste disposal to the ships, they will be not forced to stop at other ports
where these services are available; as well it would be a good source of revenue for the
port.
Another source of the delay for the vessels in UQP is the poor performance stevedores
and unavailability of equipment, which appears obviously in the results of the
questionnaire survey, this factor will have a strong effect on the work in the port to
decrease the cargo handling productivity therefore, there is a need to renew this
equipment along with JICA projects and the port should sign an agreement with a
socializing stevedoring company for all cargo handling activities and making a good
procedure to monitor their performances.
Moreover, applying the IT system is the most essential to the UQP to organize all its
activities and save ship time, as a result of saving time in the port as it would record all
the values to enable the technical personnel to find bottlenecks and other issues required
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to carry out any plan for an investment in the port in which the port should achieve its
services to avoid over-supply problems.
Although using the concession and Joint Venture operation for some berths in UQP,
which has the advantage to develop the port, there is a negative impact on the
productivity of other berths which are operated by GCPI as a government company. The
privatized berths will increase responses to users with less delay and time costs to attract
the users. Another negative factor might happen, which is over supply of berths if there
is no planning strategy to calculate the forecast volume of cargo to the port before the
GCPI will do any investment in the future.
Developing the concept of KPIs in UQP involves breaking down turnaround time into
Average Waiting Time (AWT) Average Maneuvering Time (AMT) Average Idle Time
(AIT) Average Berthing Time (ABT) Crane Utilization Ratio (CUR) and Labor
Utilization Ratio (LUR) to support a sustainable Productivity comparison with
developed ports to improve the port as a global average level.
Using IT systems for all activities in the port will make the mission easy and increase
working proficiency when an integrated automation system is used in planning,
recording, stacking, gating in/out and loading/unloading, maintenance equipment
schedules, tracking the trucks, human resource allocation.
Based on the KPI analysis, it is unnecessary to invest in new berths in UQP or put more
berths under concession and joint venture, in particular in UQPN. Reducing the waiting
time and the idle times is a better way to improve productivity of UQP by taking
practical steps, for instance, outsourcing activities in case the GCPI cannot succeed, as it
has lengthy governmental procedures.
Further studies need to be carried out for equipment utilization and labor utilization with
other KPIs in order to decide whether more investment is needed or not to enhance
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existing capacity. Implementing a Terminal Operation System will enable the port
management to analyze with more accuracy the future needs and raise the service level
to meet customers’ satisfaction.
5.2.3 LAND CONTROL
Land control involves the national highways and railway networks that serve the main
cities in Basra and Baghdad, the capital of Iraq and other connectivity to the ports. The
berths are accessed by truck via the main gate of UQP. Rail tracks connect the port via
Shouaiba junction where the area is the west of Basrah city. However, the national Iraqi
road and railway network are very old and experience several difficulties. As a result,
there is an urgent need for hinterland network renewal or repair to flow the cargo from
the UQPS and UQPN berths to the Iraqi cities smoothly.
The outbound lane of the port is relevant for all berths located in the UQPS and UQPN
which cause frequent congestion to hamper direct access to the respective berths.
The main gate at UQPN has access to berth numbers 12 to 22. There is a gate belonging
to these berths, but, unfortunately, is out of order. Therefore, it is necessary to open this
gate as an alternative way to mitigate the pressure on the main gate and provide a special
gate to the Container Terminal in the NUQP. In addition, the berths have access to the
railway network, but the rails are not useful for operations as they are neglected and
there are technical issues related to Iraqi Railways Corporation (IRC). Thus, it is
required to coordinate GCPI with IRC to renew this service to contribute with trucks for
rendering a good service and speed up the service to move the cargo.
An IT system is necessary to coordinate the trucks and direct them and distribute and
speed up the documentation that takes a long time at the main gate.
The Main Corridors are transport routes by road from Neighbouring Ports to Iraqi
Markets, trucking the cargo in direct ways in the hinterlands linking to countries of
neighbouring ports. Hence, the intensive competition requires exploiting the advantage
of the nearest distances and other benefits of UQP compared with its rivals. For
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example, in the border with Kuwait, the load truck should discharge and be replaced by
another truck. To ensure an increase of flow cargo, the GCPI, therefore, should take care
to facilitate the truck roads and optimize the railway network from UQP among the Iraqi
market shares in all its cities to get an advantage on the cargo that flows through the
corridors of the neighbouring ports. Using the connectivity of the road and truck concept
and reforming the road and rail way is the best way to get advantages and offer the
shortest distance to the markets, which, together with ports quality of service and good
facilities, may create competitive advantages compared with the port's rivals.
Furthermore, the truck fleet needs to be enlarged since the existing number of trucks is
not sufficient to meet the market requirements. On the other hand, reliable trucking
companies should be introduced as logistics service providers because most of the
trucking companies are not internationally recognized.

5.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The assessment and analysis was limited to the data needed to assess the port operations.
The lack of required data from UQP is due to the old system. If the port obtains a new IT
system, it would enable the author to qualify the performance and competitiveness levels
in port operations. However, by contacting GCPI staff, the author was able to collect the
required data with a margin of inaccurate data as a result of misprints and paper records.
Some limitations are related to the methodology that the author used, for example,
questionnaire research as a quantitative method which aims to collect opinions, attitudes,
and suggestions to identify problems. Therefore, they are affected by work relationships,
and some people may have thought that their opinions would be shared with the port
authority, resulting in consequences that they wish to avoid.
Regarding KPI analysis, there are several challenges such as the possibility of typing
errors in data reports collected from the port management. Furthermore, in UQP, the
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Turnaround Time of a vessel has many Units to record the main elements of Time in
port. Each unit is responsible for one element of the time of the vessels. For example, the
waiting time recorded is the responsibility of the coastal station and pilot station, and the
berthing and unberthing times are the responsibility of the navigational unit in the UQP,
and the handling operation time is the responsibility of port management.
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APPENDIX (1) QUESTIONNAIRE
Dear madam/sir,
I am a student of World Maritime University, and in partial fulfillment of a MSc degree I am
conducting research on supporting sustainable performance in Umm Qasr Port (UQP) and its
competitiveness. The concept behind the improvement of the port competitiveness is to solve the
problems and constraints related to time/cost in order to be more efficient and effective within a
shorter total time in port of a vessel. By doing so, it will be more attractive for the users, which
will increase the number of vessels calling this port and, therefore, result in more revenue for the
port and more benefits to the users as well. Therefore, I aim to achieve an analysis of the time at
port of a vessel, Turnaround time as well as highlight some of the human, financial and physical
problems. However, the analysis of the time at port of a vessel is not always reliable due to
limited information and databases. In the light of the expected global competition between port
facilities, the researcher wants to develop his analysis to improve the UQP performance and
make the operations more robust/reliable.
With this email I ask you for your cooperation in the research on the inventory of adaptation
measures and strategies feasible for shippers or consignees. Your cooperation helps us to inform
the researcher about how the UQP can improve and increase its competitiveness by
modifications to its facilities and minimize the time of the vessel at the port.
My request to you is the following. I would kindly like to ask you to participate in the research
by filling out a questionnaire. Alternatively, I ask you to pass this request to the person within
your company who is best informed about the firms’ transport flows. Please ask him/her to
contact me by email so I can send him/her the questionnaire.
I expect it will take about 15 minutes to complete the questionnaire. It goes without saying that
all information is collected only for academic purposes and stays confidential; no statements will
be made about individual firms. Please feel free to contact me for further information. Many
thanks in advance for your cooperation.
Best regards,
Salem G. Hussein
Shipping and Port Management
World Maritime University in Malmo Sweden
I am contacTable at E: s13033@wmu.se / salimalj@yahoo.com
Tel: 0046722575097
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م/استبيان
تحية طيبة،
انا طالب في الجامعة البحرية العالمية ,ضمن برنامج دراسة الماجستير ,هدفي دعم وادامة األداء في ميناء ام قصر
 UQPورفع قدرته التنافسية .المفهوم الكامن وراء تحسين القدرة التنافسية هومن اجل حل المشاكل والمعوقات
المتعلقه بالوقت والتكلفه المترتبه عليه لكي يكون الميناء أكثر كفاءة وفعالية وفترة بقاء اقتصاديه وامنه للسفينه .من
خالل القيام بذلك ،سوف يكون الميناء أكثر جاذبية للمستخدمين ويزيد عدد السفن الوافده اليه؛ وبالتالي ،تكون العوائد
أكثر للميناء مما يزيد من تطويره ويقلل نسب التامين المفروضه والذي يعود بالفائده لكم .لذلك،فان الباحث ينوي
تحليال شامل لمرافق خدمات الميناء ووقت السفينه في الميناء (الوقت الكلي للسفينه من فترة دخولها للميناء حتى
مغادرتها اخر عوامه مالحية) فضال عن تسليط الضوء على بعض المشاكل البشرية والمالية والمادية ومع ذلك ،فإن
الدراسه التحليليه لوقت تكلفة السفينه في الميناء ليس من باالمر السهل دائما بسبب محدودية المعلومات وقاعدة
البيانات .عالوة على ذلك في ضوء المنافسة العالمية المتوقعة في مرافق الميناء الباحث يريد أن يطور تحليله
لتحسين أداء الميناء وجعل العمليات أكثر قوة  /وفاعليه.
في هذه الدراسة سوف يتم تقييم مشكلة الطاقه االستيعابيه ووقت التكلفة في الميناء باستخدام النماذج التحليليه .وكذلك
سوف يتم اتخاذ تدابير التكيف على عدة مستويات ،ومرافق الميناء ،البنيه التحتية والفوقية ،والتدابير االدارية التي
ينبغي اتخاذها لتحسين االداء وبالتالي تتحق االرباح للجميع.
مع هذا البريد اإللكتروني أرجو حسن تعاونكم في اتمام البحث للوصول الى افضل الحلول .وبالتالي سيحصل
الباحث عن كيفية تحسين اداء الميناء وزيادة قدرته التنافسية عن طريق إدخال تعديالت على منشآته ومرافقه او
حلو ل اخرى تتعلق بطبيعة عملكم تقترحونها تؤدي الى زيادة القدرة التنافسية للميناء وبالتالي يزيد مستوئ الربح
لديكم وكذلك الميناء مما يساعد على تطويره وتجهيزه ليوافق الدول المتقدمه.
طلبي أن تشاركوا بالبحث العلمي عن طريق ملء االستبيان المرفق ادناه .وأود من جنابكم تمرير هذا الطلب إلى اي
شخص ضمن شركتكم او عملكم للقيام بمراسلتي او االتصال بي عن طريق البريد اإللكتروني حتى أستطيع أن أرسل
له  /لها ورقة االستبيان .وأتوقع أن يستغرق ملئ االستبيان حوالي  51دقيقة على االكثر .وللعلم أن جميع المعلومات
ستبقى على سريه كامله وتستخدم الغراض اكاديميه .ال تتردد في االتصال بي لمزيد من المعلومات وشكرا جزيال
مقدما لتعاونكم ،مع أطيب التحيات،
سالم جبارحسين
طالب دراسات عليا تخصص في إدارة الموانئ والنقل البحري
الجامعة البحرية العالمية في مالمو  -السويد
البريد الكترونيs13033@wmu.se /

 salimalj@yahoo.com/هاتف 0046722575097 /
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APPENDIX (2) QUESTIONNAIRE-RESPONDENT RESULTS
Shipping Lines and Agents Questionnaire-respondent results
Respondents: 63.0%
Distrubtion: 27 Q
1. Evaluation of Safety of Navigation in the Port
ITEMS
Very Poor
Poor
Satisfactory Good
Very Good
Channel Services
17.6
52.9
23.5
11.8
0.0
Depths of the Channel
11.8
64.7
11.8
5.9
0.0
Lighting System
11.8
35.3
29.4
5.9
5.9
Pilot Service
0.0
23.5
58.8
11.8
5.9
Pilot Station Performance
23.5
47.1
29.4
17.6
0.0
Coast Station
0.0
23.5
52.9
11.8
0.0
Tugging Services
0.0
70.6
23.5
11.8
0.0
Mooring Team
0.0
11.8
23.5
64.7
11.8
Punctuality(Timekeeping)
5.9
41.2
41.2
11.8
0.0
Comments:
there is required to new tugs and pilot boats
2. Availability of facilities
ITEMS
Berth availability
Pilot station vessel
Pilots availability
Tug boats
Harbour Pilot availability
Draft depth availability

Very Good
11.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
11.8
0.0

Good
52.9
17.6
47.1
11.8
35.3
5.9
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Satisfactory
35.3
29.4
41.2
17.6
47.1
29.4

Poor
11.8
41.2
11.8
64.7
5.9
47.1

Very Poor
0.0
11.8
0.0
5.9
5.9
17.6

3. Stevedores Performance and Conduct.
ITEMS
Very Poor
Poor
Satisfactory Good
Very Good
Punctuality(Timekeeping)
5.9
47.1
17.6
29.4
0.0
Performance
17.6
47.1
11.8
5.9
0.0
Discipline
29.4
29.4
41.2
35.3
0.0
Present on Station
0.0
17.6
41.2
41.2
0.0
Supervisor Corporation
11.8
23.5
29.4
23.5
11.8
Berth lengths
0.0
29.4
47.1
11.8
5.9
Lift &Crane status
17.6
29.4
41.2
0.0
0.0
Driver performance
0.0
64.7
35.3
0.0
0.0
Storage areas
23.5
29.4
29.4
11.8
5.9
Comments:
Labors and Cranes operators are not qualified and
have no valid certificates or licenses
4. Degree of Risk on General Port Safety
ITEMS
Very Risky
Type of Safety Risk
0.0
Access Channel
0.0
Pilot Embarking/Disembarking
0.0
Cargo Handling & Equipment
0.0
Dangerous Lifting Handling
0.0
Heavy Lifts Handing
23.5
Comments:

Risky
23.5
17.6
41.2
47.1
41.2
23.5

Fairly Risky
58.8
35.3
0.0
0.0
29.4
0.0

Poor
17.6
35.3
23.5
52.9
35.3
47.1

Safely
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

All discharging gears should have valid certificates
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5. Availability of Equipment and Cargo Gears
ITEMS
Very Good
Fender Conditions
52.9
Type of Equipment/Gear
0.0
Portal Cranes
0.0
Forklifts
0.0
Terminal Tractors
0.0
Container Cranes
0.0
Lashing Service
0.0
Quay Transfer Operations
0.0
Rope Slings
0.0
Wire Slings
0.0
Chain Slings
0.0
Rope Nets
0.0
Wire Nets
0.0
Cargo Trays
0.0
Plate Clamps
0.0
Pallet
0.0
Snottier Wires
0.0
Comments:

Good
47.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
29.4
11.8
5.9
11.8
11.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
17.6
11.8
17.6
11.8
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Satisfactory
0.0
23.5
11.8
52.9
41.2
5.9
11.8
17.6
11.8
5.9
35.3
29.4
29.4
17.6
11.8
17.6
29.4

Poor
0.0
41.2
41.2
35.3
41.2
52.9
47.1
64.7
64.7
52.9
52.9
47.1
52.9
35.3
41.2
52.9
52.9

Very Poor
0.0
29.4
17.6
11.8
17.6
5.9
17.6
11.8
0.0
17.6
11.8
17.6
11.8
17.6
0.0
0.0
0.0

6.

Import Documentation Duration and Cargo Delivery
ITEMS
Period
Current Maximum Duration Taking
(5) days
(10) days
Place within
17.6
11.8
Current Minimum Duration Taking
Place within

Ideal Duration for cargo delivery from
Users’ point of view?
Comments:

(15) days
52.9

(3) days

(5) days

(5-8) days

29.4

0.0

47.1

(3) days

(2) days

(1) day

52.9
17.6
29.4
Cargoes for government take a long
time in custom clearance while for
private cargo could be finished in the
same day they arrived
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7. Office Responsible for Delays within UQP Authority
Mostly Reasonably
ITEMS
Fairly Resp.
Resp.
Resp.
UQP Revenue Office
5.9
5.9
11.8
Documentation Office
0.0
5.9
23.5
Gate and Check Point
11.8
11.8
29.4
Container Delivery
0.0
11.8
29.4
Punctuality(Timekeeping)
0.0
11.8
0.0
Comments:
No comments

Poorly
Resp.
64.7
47.1
0.0
35.3
41.2

Not Resp.
0
29.4
17.6
0.0
0.0

8.

Port Community Service Provide Responsible for Cargo Delivery Delays.
Mostly Reasonable
Poorly
Organization
Fairly Resp.
Not Resp.
Resp.
Resp.
Resp.
UQP
5.9
5.9
11.8
35.3
0.0
GCPI(Port Authority)
5.9
5.9
0.0
35.3
35.3
Customs
0.0
5.9
0.0
35.3
29.4
Navy Inspection
0.0
5.9
23.5
11.8
0.0
Others
5.9
0.0
29.4
35.3
17.6
Comments:
Main reason of delay is the custom formalities and ministry of finance
regulation rely exemption
9. Source of Claims Raised Against UQP and GCPI
Major Reasonable
Poor
Source of Claim
Fair Sources
Sources
Sources
Sources
Rebate
5.9
0.0
11.8
5.9
Cargo Damage
5.9
11.8
41.2
0.0
Grounded
11.8
41.2
29.4
5.9
Primary Claims
0.0
5.9
35.3
41.2
Pilferage
0.0
0.0
0.0
47.1
Theft
5.9
29.4
0.0
0.0
Other Motives (Persuasion)
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Total
17
17
17
17
Comments:
Port is not secured against pilferage and theft at all
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Negligible
Source
5.9
17.6
5.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
17

10. Interests on EDI Web for Port Users
Type of Service Interested
Very Much Reasonably
Cargo Clearance
0.0
17.6
Email Services
0.0
17.6
Bills Settlements
0.0
41.2
National Shipping Agency Co.
0.0
17.6
Comments:

Fairly
0.0
0.0
29.4
0.0

Poorly
52.9
0.0
0.0
41.2

Not at all
17.6
0.0
0.0
11.8

11. Observation of “ First in First Served” in Providing Service in UQP Offices
Reasonably
UQP Offices
Very Good
Fairly Good Poorly
Not at all
Good
Documentation
0.0
0.0
5.9
52.9
0.0
Container Inspection Area for Custom
17.6
0.0
17.6
47.1
0.0
List Preparation
Container Loading List Preparation
17.6
0.0
17.6
29.4
0.0
Port Financial Office
5.9
5.9
41.2
0.0
0.0
Motor Vehicle Section
5.9
5.9
41.2
0.0
0.0
Delivery of Containers
5.9
5.9
52.9
0.0
0.0
Commercial Department
5.9
5.9
52.9
0.0
17.6
Comments:
General Comments
1.Long procedures and routine for in/out the trucks.
2. every month the financial ministry issued a new decision to
custom office.
3.Cargoes and Containers have no organized yard therefore someGeneral Comments:
time the consignees need a whole day to find his containe
4.There is no sufficient equipment for loading and unloading.
5. All shore cranes are always faced to out of order.
6. The staff is need to train.

Name:
Company:
Grade:
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APPENDIX (3) MONTHLY MUD DREDGING CARRY IN 2010

Monthly Dredgers' Report in 2010 for Mud loads in Metric Tons
Dredger Vessels Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Basrah
144000 138600 185400 133200 5400
0
0
0
0
0
Al-Zubair
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Tahreer
108000 118000 164000 172000 134000 156000 140000 64000 180000 130000
Marbid
98000 64000 190000 166000 108000 86000 180000 118000 130000 134000
Teba
108000 189000 165000 246000 183000 159000 174000 210000 180000 192000
Saif Al-Karar
0
0
38400 181200 184800 97200 268800 250800 70800 178800
Ram Allah 122400 157200 171600 26400
0
0
0
0
0
0
Nasria
106500 23250 107250 135000 177000 112500 78000 92250 9750 104050
Total
686900 690050 1021650 1059800 792200 610700 840800 735050 570550 738850
General Note 1. All dredgers had failures of Generators and Main engines for several times during the work time
2. Shortage in availability of the spare parts

Nov

Dec

0
0
75950
126000
138000
15600
0
113250

0
0

468800 0

3. Long government procedures to provide the spare parts by technical and financial committees causing the delay of the maintenance
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0

APPENDIX (4) VESSELS CALLING UQP IN 2010 TO 2012
UQP

Years

ITEM

UNIT

2010

2011

2012

AVR

Total

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Unit

390
2,776,358
38
1,800,999
30
947,383
28
455,656
27
483,142
335
528,659
59
99,671
59
347,461
95
100,136
45
0

345
2,662,142
54
2,748,557
33
1,049,057
38
783,413
22
425,391
291
662,628
0
0
52
232,553
57
58,376
100
0

350
3,475,367
52
2,637,732
33
1,092,684
32
714,794
6
129,008
252
681,959
0
0
63
514,862
45
88,784
89
0

362
2,971,289
48
2,395,763
32
1,029,708
33
651,288
18
345,847
293
624,415
20
33,224
58
364,959
66
82,432
78
0

1,106

992

922

7,539,465

8,622,117

9,335,190

a. Containers

Gt
b. Grains

UNIT

c. Rice

UNIT

Gt
Gt
d. Sugar

UNIT

e. Cements

Unit

Gt
Gt
f. General Cargo

Unit
Gt

g. Passangers & Goods

Unit
Gt

h. Pipes & Iron

Unit
Gt

i. Cars

Unit
Gt

j. Others

Unit
G

TOTAL

Unit
Gt

TOTAL

Unit
Gt
Gt (000)

YEARS
2010
2,011
2,012

TOTAL

1,106

992

922

7,539,465

8,622,117

9,335,190

7,539

8,622

9,335

Vessels
1106
992
922
3020

Yearly Growth
GT
Vsls Growth%
7539465
8622117 -3.774834437
9335190 -2.317880795
25496772 -3.046357616
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1,085
8,913,867
144
7,187,288
96
3,089,124
98
1,953,863
55
1,037,541
878
1,873,246
59
99,671
174
1,094,876
197
247,296
234
0
1,007
3,020
8,498,924 25,496,772
1,007

GT Growth%
4.246231641
2.796718738
3.521475189

APPENDIX (5) WILHELMSEN-STATEMENT OF FACTS-M/V SIREEN-B
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WILHELMSEN-STATEMENT OF FACTS- M/V SIREEN-B
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APPENDIX (5-B) TURNAROUND TIME CALCULATIONS OF M/V SIREEN-B
Cargo Type
M/V SIREEN-B
Sugar
11/02/2011 14:45
11/02/2011 14:50
12/02/2011 14:50
12/02/2011 15:48
12/02/2011 21:45
12/02/2011 22:10
12/02/2011 23:00
18/02/2011 15:00
20/02/2011 14:00
20/02/2011 17:35 Stopped
1
20/02/2011 23:20
21/02/2011 07:00
2
21/02/2011 23:10
22/02/2011 06:15
3
22/02/2011 11:20
22/02/2011 12:30
4
stop partly
22/02/2011 20:40
22/02/2011 21:00
5
23/02/2011 00:25
23/02/2011 06:30
6
23/02/2011 13:40
23/02/2011 14:00
7
23/02/2011 20:50
24/02/2011 12:10
8
24/02/2011 14:00
24/02/2011 15:00
9
24/02/2011 23:20
26/02/2011 07:00
26/02/2011 17:30
26/02/2011 19:45
26/02/2011 20:00
27/02/2011 00:30

Ship name
Arrival at entrance buoy
Anchored outer anchorage
Pilot on board
Starts manoeuvring
Ship at berth
Vessel free pratique granted
Samples taken for cargo
Analysis result received
Cargo Custom Clearance
Operations start ((Commenced))
Operations stopped due to Rain and B/T
Operations restart
Operation stopped for B/T
Operations restart
Operation stopped the vessel shifted astern
Operations restart
Operation stopped for Crane N. 1 out of order
Operations restart
Operation stopped for end of shift and B/T
Operations restart
Operation stopped due to no trucks
Operations restart
Operation stopped due to no trucks
Operations restart
Operation stopped due to no trucks
Operations restart
Operation stopped due to no trucks, start B/T
Operations restart
End of operations
Pilot on board
Ship leaves the berth
Ship leaves the port

Mints
22185.00
1503.00
642.00
20055.00
4395.00
15625.00
21.9%
7.5%

Average time in port (min)
Average waiting time (min)
Average manoeuvring time (min)
Average service/berth time (min)
Average productive time (min)
Average idle time (min)
Average productive ratio (%)
Grade of waitng (or Ave Waiting Rate) (%)
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Hrs
369.75
25.05
10.70
334.25
73.25
260.42
0%
0%

Days
15.41
1.04
0.45
13.93
3.05
10.85
0.02%
0%

APPENDIX (6) INCHCAPE-STATEMENT OF FACTS- M/V CAPTAIN HARRY
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INCHCAPE-STATEMENT OF FACTS- M/V CAPTAIN HARRY
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INCHCAPE-STATEMENT OF FACTS- M/V CAPTAIN HARRY
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APPENDIX (6-B) TURNAROUND TIME CALCULATIONS OF M/V CAPTAIN
HARRY
Ship name
Arrival at entrance buoy
Anchored in outer anchorage
Anchored out and left anchorage
Pilot on board
Starts manoeuvring
Ship at berth all lines fast
Operations start ((Commenced))
Operations stopped due to no trucks
Operations restart
Operation stopped due to rains
Operations restart
Operation stopped due to rain
Operations restart
Operation stopped for Crane N. 1 out of order
Operations restart
Operation stopped for end of shift and B/T
Operations restart
Operation stopped due to no trucks
Operations restart
End of operations
Cargo Documents Commence
Cargo Documents Complete
Pilot on board
Ship leaves the berth
Ship leaves the port

Average time in port (min)
Average waiting time (min)
Average manoeuvring time (min)
Average service/berth time (min)
Average productive time (min)
Average idle time (min)
Average productive ratio (%)
Grade of waitng (or Ave Waiting Rate) (%)
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Cargo Type
M/V Captain Harry
Bulk Rice
08/01/2011 08:00
08/01/2011 09:00
02/02/2011 18:30
02/02/2011 19:50
02/02/2011 19:50
03/02/2011 01:12
03/02/2011 20:20 Stopped
1
03/02/2011 22:20
04/02/2011 10:00
2
04/02/2011 01:50
05/02/2011 08:10
3
05/02/2011 16:15
06/02/2011 07:15
4
07/02/2011 22:00
07/02/2011 23:30
5
08/02/2011 00:01
08/02/2011 01:00
6
13/02/2011 07:00
13/02/2011 09:20
14/02/2011 11:10
14/02/2011 15:30
14/02/2011 17:30
14/02/2011 22:00
14/02/2011 22:35
15/02/2011 02:40
Mints
54400.00
36710.00
602.00
17123.00
11581.00
5507.00
67.6%
214.4%

Hrs
906.67
611.83
10.03
285.38
193.02
91.78
1%
4%

Days
37.78
25.49
0.42
11.89
8.04
3.82
0.05%
0%

